4 PERSPECTIVES ON BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS | VOL 41 | 2023 icized Denmark’s foreign and security affairs report for not considering Greenlandic interests (Jacobsen, 2020). Outside of policy considerations, Greenland and the Faroe Islands are not always used to their fullest potential on the world stage. Initially, the two nations played a prominent role in foreign affairs. The former Premier of Greenland, Lars-Emil Johansen, signed the Ottawa Declaration on behalf of the Kingdom of Denmark; and, until 2011, Denmark, Greenland, and the Faroe Islands were represented equally at the Arctic Council. Subsequently, this shared representation changed when Greenland and the Faroe Islands lost their seats at the table. Although this decision was subsequently reversed, their respective flags were replaced with one large, symbolic Danish flag. Greenland can participate with Denmark in informal meetings; however, as mentioned previously, Greenlandic politicians are often overlooked. Contrastingly, Greenland manages the coordination and executive role of the Sustainable Development Working Group on behalf of the Kingdom of Denmark. Moreover, Greenland can participate in the Arctic Council through the Inuit Circumpolar Council; however, this is outside the delegation of Denmark (Jacobsen, 2020). The role of Denmark in Greenland is clearly complicated and cries out for resolution. The relationship can further be analyzed through the relationship between Denmark, Greenland, and the US. American involvement The US involvement in Greenland is defined first and foremost by its security interests. The US first established a presence in Greenland in 1941 with the development of Thule Air Base, the largest air force base in the Arctic region, creating a security relationship between the US and Denmark. The US expanded this presence in the 1950s with the construction of the Distant Early Warning Line and the Ballistic Early Warning System. These systems are vital to the US presence in the Arctic—they act as a missile defense system, a satellite operations hub, and part of the US Air Force network. The activity of these systems peaked at the height of the Cold War, but their strategic relevance is once again being discussed amidst the race for the Arctic. During the Cold War, a US plane with four nuclear bombs on board accidentally crashed, which contaminated a fjord forcing a number of Greenlanders to resettle. Denmark’s “nuclear-free zone” policy further complicated this situation. To ensure that this did not happen again, the Itilleq Declaration of 2003 put into writing that Greenland would be involved in relevant foreign policy decisions by requiring the Danish government to consider the perspectives of Greenlandic politicians. The declaration was a precondition for the negotiations of Thule Air Base as a missile defense shield (Takahashi et al., 2019), laying the groundwork for a three-way symbiotic relationship between the US, Denmark, and Greenland. A renewed interest in the relationship between the US and Greenland was highlighted in 2019, when President Trump broached the idea of purchasing Greenland from the Kingdom of Denmark. The White House’s increased interest in the military importance of Greenland prompted this offer. A year prior to this announcement, a declaration of intent was signed by John Rood, the US Secretary of Defense, in which the US stated its intention to pursue investments in airport infrastructure in Greenland for the purpose of military and civilian purposes such that the US can increase military response and surveillance (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Iceland, 2020). The relationship between the US, Denmark, and Greenland was reaffirmed in the US National Strategy for the Arctic Region 2022–2032, which aims to deepen relationships with allies and partners, including Denmark and Greenland. As previously noted, Denmark often bases foreign policy decisions on those made by the US, so understanding American positions can help inform decisions made by Denmark in the Arctic. The US approach comprises security, climate change and environmental protection, sustainable and economic development, and international cooperation and governance (Fleener, 2013). Security is the first pillar of the US Arctic plan since there are no security protections within the Arctic Council. Chinese involvement As is the case with the US, there exists a triangular relationship between Denmark, Greenland, and China. This relationship has existed since the 1950s, when Denmark and China formed a diplomatic relationship. That relationship fell under scrutiny in 2013, when China’s interest in the Arctic peaked, and Greenland’s interest in China did the same. In 2014, Kai Holst Andersen, the Deputy Foreign Minister of Greenland, declared Greenland’s interest in investments from China (Sørensen, 2017). Although China is not an Arctic state, the country is interested in the region. For years, China has claimed to be a “near-Arctic state” and has been pushing to move away from letting Arctic states determine legislation in the region and toward internationalizing Arctic affairs, which would make the country an influential stakeholder in the Arctic.
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