3 MARTINDALE CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE in the Arctic, composed of the Arctic Five (Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the US) as well as Finland, Iceland, and Sweden—does not have authority on security threats (Arctic Portal, n.d.). The race for the Arctic in Greenland Two-thirds of Greenland is above the Arctic Circle, reaching as close as 500 miles to the North Pole (International Trade Administration, 2022). This makes it a significant area regarding Arctic affairs. To discuss the race for the Arctic in Greenland, it is essential to appreciate the relationships between Greenland and key Arctic players, such as Denmark, the US, and China, all desirous of access for logistical and resource reasons. Danish involvement Denmark plays an intriguing role in the Arctic, in that it is deemed an Arctic state only through its sovereignty over Greenland (Jacobsen, 2020). However, Denmark rarely entrusts Greenland with fair representation in exercising political influence on Arctic policies. Through Greenland, Denmark has been able to stake a claim to more than 550,000 mi2 of landmass and, through the continental shelf project, has extended its claim to include additional territory in the Arctic Ocean. This extension claim is possible through the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 76, which states that coastal Arctic states can extend their continental shelves, thereby gaining more control in the region beyond 200 nautical miles if they can document bathymetric proof of the base of their continental shelf to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Denmark, et al., 2015). The Kingdom of Denmark has obtained a seabed stone from the slopes of the Lomonosov Ridge, which crosses the polar ocean from Greenland to Russia, that it claims originated from Greenland. Scientists have partially confirmed this, but more samples are needed to prove it with certainty. However, if more testing confirms Denmark’s territorial extension claims, it can claim the right to exploit resources in the region (Brix, 2017). Denmark is the only entity involved in all international councils regarding the Arctic, which include the following: the Arctic Council, the Ilulissat Declaration, the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, NATO, the UN, and the EU (F. Viltoft Mygind, remarks to Martindale Center, October 24, 2022). The Ilulissat Declaration was a first-of-its-kind political statement, signed in Ilulissat, Greenland, in 2008, by the Arctic Five. The declaration signified that the Arctic Five would act peacefully and responsibly in the Arctic, settling claims through negotiation and cooperation. Denmark’s Arctic strategy from 2011 to 2020 reflected the sentiments of this declaration by working toward “a peaceful, secure and safe Arctic…in close cooperation with [its] international partners” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Denmark, et al., 2015). Clearly, respecting the Arctic and its stakeholders is important to the Kingdom and all Arctic governing bodies. The Kingdom’s newest foreign and security policy, released in January 2022, offers further insight into exactly how this will be accomplished. Notably, the Arctic is the fourth priority of this strategy behind a strengthened focus on migration, promoting exports and economic diplomacy, and strengthening European policy, thereby demonstrating the gravity with which the Kingdom regards this issue. One way in which Denmark will increase its presence in the Arctic is through the Arctic Capacity Package. This 1.5Bkr ($219M) commitment will increase the presence of the Danish Armed Forces in the Arctic and North Atlantic via long-range drones, radar, and satellite monitoring. It will also include civil society support through rescue operations, fishery inspections, research, and environmental and climate monitoring (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2022). As with the 2011–2020 Arctic strategy, the 2022 foreign and security policy will promote low tension in the Arctic, peaceful and sustainable development, and cooperation within the Kingdom (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2022). Moreover, the Arctic Capacity Package will focus on increasing collaboration within the Danish Realm and contributing to NATO’s overall Arctic initiative. The foreign and security policy also names the US as “an unrivaled and crucial partner for Denmark [and its] most important security policy ally” (Olsvig & Pram Gad, 2021). Thus, the Kingdom will aim to stand alongside the US in handling Arctic and worldwide tensions. Denmark emphasizes cooperation within its foreign policy, but not all Kingdom members believe it is fully realized. Shortly after the Arctic Capacity Package was released, parliamentarians from Greenland and the Faroe Islands (the third territory within the Danish Kingdom) claimed that neither nation was “adequately involved in the deliberations on the package.” Moreover, Greenland in foreign and security affairs, even within the Arctic, has been characterized as responsive—accepting initiatives by Denmark and the US—rather than directive (Olsvig & Pram Gad, 2021). In 2016, Vittus Qujaukitsoq, Greenland’s former Minister of Foreign Affairs, crit-
RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy MTA0OTQ5OA==