5 MARTINDALE CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE China could influence international treaties and regulations by making Arctic affairs a global issue rather than a matter governed by the Arctic Council (Mohr, 2020). To further assert its intentions in the Arctic, China has released an Arctic policy driven by polar research relating to melting ice and climate change, energy and mineral resources, governance, and sea routes (Sørensen, 2017). In the policy, China declares a Polar Silk Road, an extension of its belt and road initiative: a global development strategy (Goodman & Maddox, 2018). This policy concerns all Arctic states, which consider China the country they are the least comfortable with regarding regional affairs (Mohr, 2020). However, this has not stopped China from participating in the region. In 2013, China signed a free trade agreement with Iceland. The country also has many research centers in the Arctic, including the Yellow River Station in Svalbard, Norway. Moreover, China has already made many trips through the Northeast Passage with its icebreakers, Snow Dragon and Snow Dragon 2, and determined that it is 30% shorter to navigate through this passage than through the Strait of Malacca or the Suez Canal (Sørensen, 2017). This is still not a more economically viable option; however, as travel in the Arctic intensifies, the cost of navigating it will decrease with advancing technologies. China has also been able to interject itself in the Arctic through Greenland. China is actively involved in four mining projects in Greenland, and as Camilla Sørensen points out, Chinese enterprises have not initiated these projects. Instead, they were undertaken by the Greenlandic government or other western countries. Denmark initially favored this relationship, wanting to grow the Greenlandic economy and strengthen its ties with China. However, tension grew regarding whether Chinese involvement in the Greenlandic economy would further the independence movement in Greenland. China’s interest in Greenland has seemingly tapered off, both because of the country’s interest in not harming its relationship with Denmark and the price of investing in Greenland is a considerable hurdle to overcome for an uncertain payoff, which has frustrated Greenlanders (Sørensen, 2017). Greenland’s attitude and its relevance Understanding Greenland’s political system, its politicians’ reactions to Danish Arctic relations, and why the Arctic is significant in terms of independence is essential to comprehending the perspectives of Greenland with regard to the race for the Arctic and the nation’s part in it. The Greenlandic political system is based on the Danish government model, with a strong central government in the capital city, Nuuk, and five municipalities spread throughout the island. Today, the government is composed of 31 representatives across seven political parties. Of these parties, the three most prominent are the Siumut, Atassut, and Inuit Ataqatigiit. The Siumut party is a social democratic party that was at the forefront of the Greenlandic Independence movement in the late 1970s. This party is the largest in Greenland and has maintained a majority for most of the island’s autonomous reign. The Atassut party was a conservative union for the first 20 years of Greenland’s autonomy; however, around 2000, the party changed stances in favor of independence. This party was a significant rival for the Siumut party until recently, when the Inuit Ataqatigiit, a socialist, pro-independence party, overtook it. Although there are seven parties currently active in government, the fact that the three largest parties share similar goals demonstrates that the objectives of the Greenlandic government have remained steady since 1979 and that independence is at the forefront of this movement (Grydehøj, 2020). A key component in the battle for influence in Greenland among Denmark, the US, and China is that Greenland cannot make foreign policy decisions. It can make business and trade decisions that reflect its response to the Arctic race. To the dismay of Denmark and the US, Greenland has yet to rule out the possibility of future negotiations with China, which would give that country a foothold in the Arctic. The general sentiment of Greenlandic politicians is that Denmark already dominates the island, so choosing to partner with China may not cause any profound changes: a foreign government would exert control over its economy. This fear escalated in 2018, when there was tension between the governments of Greenland and Denmark; Denmark and the US anticipated that Greenland would partner with China in contracts for the island’s airport expansion. However, these tensions were put to rest when Greenland partnered with Denmark after all (Grydehøj, 2020). The Greenlandic government choosing to partner with Denmark can be taken as a positive sign that the government of Greenland intends to continue strengthening its relationships with the Kingdom of Denmark. This sign is supported by a foreign policy poll in Greenland showing that the Greenlandic people favor cooperation with the US and Denmark rather than with China (Bülow, 2018). It is yet to be seen how these relationships will develop, especially in the light of an independence movement. Still, for now, Greenland is backing Denmark in the race for the Arctic.
RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy MTA0OTQ5OA==