31 MARTINDALE CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE to soften criticism or push certain narratives to protect their financial stability during politically sensitive periods (Petković, 2014). This interference was apparent during the 2016 elections, when concerns emerged about uneven visibility of candidates, with selective emphasis and favorable framing of certain candidates (Jugo et al., 2018). In a highly concentrated television market, these dynamics can have significant effects on the perception of candidates and the fairness of the democratic processes. The selective framing present in the 2016 elections was not an isolated incident; earlier, in 2011, a popular political talk show Latinica was cancelled with no direct explanation given. Created by Croatian television host Denis Latin, Latinica was famous for covering controversial topics that were relevant in Croatian society. There was significant pushback from the broadcaster HRT throughout the show’s tenure, with sections removed, softened, or avoided entirely (Pjesivac et al., 2017). After Latin continued to address controversial political issues, the show was ultimately cancelled. Croatian journalists attributed the cancellation to political pressures from elites in response to its critical stance on the current administration (Pjesivac et al., 2017). Latin was seen as one of the rare journalists who seemed like an “honest man.” Yet, he was punished for a differing stance. One Croatian journalist stated, “Most of the time they (journalists) serve the politician more than the public. They write the stories based on who pays them and how much” (Pjesivac et al., 2017). This comment shows how the public becomes the ultimate casualty as they lose access to a range of political thought, a pillar of democratic health. Rather than receiving numerous perspectives, one set of narratives is pushed, dependent on who is in power. The show’s cancellation is consistent with broader concerns about declining media freedom in Croatia; more importantly, it is similar to the censorship under Yugoslavia. In both cases, political discourse and news content are filtered by a small group of actors, prioritizing their own interest versus those of the Croatian people. Implications for democratic accountability Ongoing challenges to democratic accountability in Croatia emerge through structural vulnerabilities in the media system. The success of the electoral process is dependent on the electorate’s ability to participate as informed political actors. The European Commission for Democracy through Law, also known as the Venice Commission, states that electoral law is designed under the assumption that citizens have access to balanced media environments. In practice, even if elections follow the law, Croatian voters still struggle to fully understand their choices in a media environment that inherently constrains viewpoints (Venice Commission, 2025). This issue of plurality in Croatian media markets has remained consistent; the MPM score recorded in 2025 was 67%, still indicating high risk (Bilić, 2025). With plurality, transparency, and political independence all classified as high risk, the current media system exposes its audience to selective content that significantly influences their political views, contrary to an environment necessary for transparent political discussion (Grbeša & Volarević, 2021). The structural vulnerabilities are amplified by Croatia’s aging demographic, as older viewers’ reliance on broadcast television increases their exposure to selective political narratives. Croatia’s media system continues to shape the flow of information and constrain democratic accountability despite the transition to privatization, a process that did not dismantle the structures inherited from Yugoslavia, instead transforming them to exercise control through consolidated ownership. Recommendations First, Croatia must create an independent institution to correct the power imbalance in the media regulatory environment. The AEM, tasked with overseeing Croatian media, is susceptible to political manipulation through the appointment of its leadership, as previously noted. The current system appoints individuals not on merit but on political affiliation (Bilić & Petričušić, 2024). In contrast to Croatia’s politically vulnerable system, Finland offers a unique double-pronged approach to fight media concentration. Finland’s Traffic and Communications Agency serves as a government-backed regulator responsible for structural and legal safeguards, and its Council for Mass Media (JSN) operates as an independent institution that upholds media ethics (European Commission, 2007). In a legal sense, the AEM and the Finnish agency are responsible for similar functions (i.e., licensing, ownership transparency, and market compliance). But Croatia lacks a key aspect of Finland’s powerful dual institutional governance: an independent regulator. When JSN identifies a violation, it issues a public statement highlighting the violation and requiring the outlet to publish the JSN’s findings (Ylikoski & Ala-Fossi, 2025). This watchdog has drastically boosted public confidence in the media and, more importantly, upheld democratic accountability in Finland through transparen-
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