32 PERSPECTIVES ON BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS | VOL 44 | 2026 cy. Finland’s MPM score sits at 38%, indicating a medium- to low-risk media environment (Ylikoski & Ala-Fossi, 2025), well below Croatia’s 2025 score of 54%, even with similar pressures (Bilić, 2025). Although this proposed solution does not directly solve the core issue of market concentration, it provides a mechanism to hold broadcasters accountable for the accuracy of their reporting, regardless of ownership. For democratic processes to function, the populace needs access to credible, accurate information. By strengthening transparency and constraining political interference, an independent watchdog creates a less dangerous media environment by addressing the institutional flaws that allow the distortion of democratic accountability. Croatia could create an independent watchdog (similar to Finland’s JSN) to help balance the immense power held by the AEM and boost trust in the media. Second, even with an independent watchdog and appointment reform, Croatia’s regulatory environment would remain largely unchanged without consistent enforcement. Croatia’s media system is undermined more by deficient oversight than by a lack of legal frameworks. Although existing legislation prohibits concealed ownership structures and political interference, these laws are rarely invoked. In fact, Croatia’s media system remains exposed to “inefficient mechanisms” (Tešić, 2025). To address this weakness, Croatia could establish a dedicated division within the AEM. A useful model is Ireland’s Online Safety and Media Regulation Act of 2022, which established an independent body, the Coimisiún na Meán, explicitly responsible for the implementation of policy, with power to impose administrative financial sanctions and compel cooperation from media institutions (Govern- ment of Ireland, 2022). Although long-term outcomes of this act are still unclear (as the act became fully applicable in early 2023), Ireland’s approach offers a viable solution. Admittedly, though, without consistent implementation, laws will remain ineffective. Although media conglomerates appear powerful, their impact is amplified by an audience not yet equipped to question and interpret information. Addressing the effects of centralized control in the media is incomplete without an education curriculum that develops tools to identify misinformation and manipulative narratives. Recent data from Sweden show how media literacy programs can strengthen democratic integrity. Sweden has long integrated media and information literacy into its national curriculum for responsible media use across all education levels. The MIK Sveriges knowledge bank is a national resource that gathers and disseminates tools related to media literacy; it has resulted in Sweden receiving an MPM score of 8% for media literacy, falling in the very low risk category (Färdigh, 2025). Croatia adopting a similar strategy (specifically targeted at older audiences) could significantly improve the population’s ability to detect manipulation in the media, ultimately reinforcing democracy. Conclusion Of the various forms of media available in the country, television remains the most influential due to widespread access and consumption. As a result, concentration in this industry carries greater democratic implications than in other forms of media. When the television market consists of a few key players, they dictate what information is available to the public, which political agendas are pushed, and how political events are framed. These risks are intensified by Croatia’s aging demographic, as older Croatians rely heavily on broadcast television. Croatia’s transition to a privatized system did not eliminate the structural issues present in the media system during the Homeland War but reconfigured them. The public broadcaster HRT remains politically exposed through appointment procedures, while foreign-owned commercial broadcasters such as RTL and Nova TV have disproportionate sway in national discourse attributable to their substantial market share. A system has been created in which vital information is filtered through institutional and commercial interests rather than disseminated for the public interest. The disproportionately held power of television broadcasting companies distorts democratic accountability through structural flaws in enforcement and regulation. Although Croatia has moved past overt censorship of the early Yugoslav government, contemporary shortcomings continue to hinder democratic accountability through less direct means, with similar results. Opaque ownership arrangements, lack of media diversity, and politically vulnerable regulatory bodies still restrict the public’s ability to identify whose interests shape televised content. With television the primary source of political information for most Croatians, these distortions can affect electoral fairness, voter agency, and the quality of democratic participation. As seen in the cases of Finland and Ireland, highly consolidated media markets do not always undermine democracy when independent watchdogs and
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