30 PERSPECTIVES ON BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS | VOL 44 | 2026 tions operate legally, opaque corporate structures and potential political or economic pressure lie beneath the surface. Ownership often involves complex cross-border holdings, with unclear ownership structures (Bilić & Petričušić, 2024). The AEM is responsible for promoting public interest and media pluralism, encouraging media literacy, and monitoring media structures to make holdings publicly accessible. Although improving public transparency is a central function of this agency, the task is nearly impossible in practice in the current environment. Even though Article 61 of the Media Act prohibits media service providers from concealing the ownership structure, many owners exploit legal loopholes that obscure who has ultimate control. Through these legal workarounds, owners in the Croatian media market remain hidden behind layers of business entities, making it impossible to know who owns and influences these institutions (Bilić & Petričušić, 2024). Without transparency, citizens lack clear understanding of whose interests ultimately shape the information they consume. This opacity inhibits identifying manipulation in news coverage, reducing trust in the media. When audiences cannot determine whose interests are shaping narratives, they are more likely to assume editorial bias, which directly erodes confidence in the news. Public sentiment directly reflects this decline of trust in news, with percentages falling from 45% in 2021 to just 32% in 2024 (Reuters Institute…, 2025). Since television remains the primary vehicle for news in Croatia, perceptions of a compromised or manipulated system undermine the conditions needed for meaningful democratic participation. Political influence Beyond ownership opacity, Croatia’s media system is also vulnerable to direct political interference. According to a 2023 MPM report, Croatia scored 71%, placing it in the high-risk category for political independence, indicating significant vulnerabilities to political sway in the media (Bilić & Petričušić, 2024). The report outlines numerous regulatory shortfalls, the most significant being Article 64 of the Electronic Media Act, which sets limitations on ownership shares for “connected persons.” It does not, however, include parties, partisan groups, or politicians in its definition of “connected persons,” thereby tolerating political interference in media institutions (Bilić & Petričušić, 2024). The AEM houses the Council of Electronic Media, which grants and revokes broadcasting concessions and permits and supervises the implementation of program provisions established by law (Grbeša & Volarević, 2021). The AEM holds considerable power in Croatia’s media sector, shaping regulatory decisions along with the broader structure of media institutions. Even so, this influential regulatory agency is vulnerable to political control, as the head of the council is appointed by Parliament, allowing the ruling party to determine the agency’s priorities and decisions. This arrangement undermines its credibility as an independent regulator and raises important questions about political manipulation of the media. The pattern echoes the socialist period, when media served the interests of those in power, not operating as independent institutions. Clear evidence came in 2016–2019, when nearly 70 journalists from the public broadcaster HRT were sidelined. These actions were widely seen as retaliation for unfavorable reporting on the current administration (Griffen, 2016). Even with widespread protest, this trend has continued. In 2018, HRT filed more than 30 lawsuits against its own journalists and independent outlets that were again seen as retaliation for critical reporting (U.S. Department of State, 2025). These incidents hint at a larger systemic issue: 75.2% of media professionals surveyed in Croatia identify political influence as the media system’s primary problem (Grbeša & Volarević, 2021). Electoral implications Private broadcasters are not immune to political power, as they are regularly subject to pressure from political figures and business elites. With Nova TV and RTL holding significant market share, hundreds of thousands of Croatians view their content daily. This extensive reach makes broadcasters attractive to those seeking to advance political or commercial agendas. One example of this dynamic occurred when the director of commercial television at Nova TV, Sinsa Svilan, was investigated for accepting a bribe to broadcast content produced by Core Media, a media company owned by a private equity firm (Petković, 2014). Although this is just one case, it illustrates the broader environment in Croatia’s media market where commercial broadcasters become intertwined with politics, leading to decisions shaped by external interests. These dynamics are reinforced by financial pressures, as commercial broadcasters rely heavily on advertising revenue and, in some cases, on state-linked funding streams that are influenced by political actors. Ministries, agencies, and public institutions purchase advertising space to promote various policies, projects, and public campaigns; however, there are no clear criteria to determine which broadcasters receive this revenue (Paparella et al., 2022). As a result, broadcasters face incentives
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