Perspectives Vol 44 - Croatia

27 MARTINDALE CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE owned media outlets were authorized to broadcast to the whole federation at a given time, due to security concerns (Mihelj, 2008). The Yugoslav government wanted complete power over information distributed nationally, minimizing the chances of widespread dissent and potential revolution. Although there were decentralized media structures operating in each of the six republics, ultimate control remained centralized. Despite each republic maintaining its own media, all outlets were still subject to the harsh censorship of Yugoslavia through the Agitation and Propaganda Department, known as Agitprop. Regardless of each republic’s media environment, Agitprop ensured all republics complied with state-issued guidelines, under which journalists were treated not as legitimate or independent media professionals but as extensions of the state. In turn, given most journalists’ active participation in spreading propaganda for the government, they were regularly regarded as “socio-political workers” (Ibáñez et al., 2024). During this period, Yugoslavia lacked independent oversight of its media industry, both internally and externally, and narratives contrary to the state were silenced before they could begin to spread (Lyon, 2003). Media during the Homeland War (1991–1995) After Croatia gained independence from Yugoslavia, its media landscape became heavily shaped by political authority. The war between Croatia and the Serb-controlled Yugoslav People’s Army marked a monumental shift in the media system. The first ruling party of modern Croatia was the Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica (Croatian Democratic Union), led by Franjo Tudman. Tudman was extremely influential in shaping the media during the Homeland War (1991–1995), using state broadcasters to spread propaganda and cultivate his image (Grbeša & Volarević, 2021). Most independent media actors during the war adhered to state censorship; only a handful catered to audiences critical of the government (Thompson, 1999). These outlets highlighted corruption, hypocrisy, and wrongdoings of the regime. Tudman used lawsuits as well as verbal attacks via television appearances, aggressively insulting independent outlets and resorting to threats and false claims (Hedl, 2000). This legacy of centralized media weakened Croatia’s media institutions, creating opportunities for political influence and foreign domination. Although Croatia started to formally transition away from this socialist system, the patterns of centralization and insufficient oversight did not dissipate, paving the way for a modern media system in which similar forms of control persist. Transition to privatization After the end of the Homeland War in 1995, Croatia began to restructure the media environment and move toward privatization. Given the state’s history of censorship and strict control under Tudman, commercialization of the media was Croatia’s sole path to media pluralism and diversity (Peruško, 2013). This transition was far from smooth, as the war had severely damaged the economy. Much of the country’s capital stock in large utilities and telecommunication firms had been destroyed (Franičević, 1999). Rebuilding required substantial investments, but Croatia lacked financial resources in the postwar period. To address this funding gap, Croatia implemented laws that actively encouraged foreign investment, seen as both a development tool and an instrument of privatization (Franičević, 1999). The privatization transition depended on laws passed by the Croatian Parliament in the 1990s and early 2000s, beginning with the 1996 Telecommunications Act, which marked the first major legislative initiative after independence aimed at opening Croatia’s media sector (Peruško, 2010). The Act allowed private companies to enter telephone services, radio, and, notably, TV broadcasting, ending the long-standing state monopoly. In 2003, the Electronic Media Act created the Agency for Electronic Media (AEM), which grants and supervises broadcast licenses to both domestic and foreign institutions (Peruško, 2010). These acts affected the content delivered and the role television played in shaping public opinion, cultural identity, and democratic engagement. Foreign investment was economically necessary but ultimately shifted control of an industry integral to Croatia’s democratic health away from domestic hands. Even though privatization was intended to promote pluralism and reduce state control, it ultimately led to a small number of foreign owners instead of distributing control more evenly across Croatia’s media market. The next section explores television’s current role; usage patterns in Croatian society; and the structure, ownership, and impact of the country’s major television broadcasters. Television’s role and ownership structure in Croatia today Television’s prominence in Croatia stems from its accessibility and its historical role as a centralized medium during the Yugoslav and postindependence periods, serving as a vital source of national information and identity. In Croatia, 99% of households own at least one television set, suggesting near-universal

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