9 MARTINDALE CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE The perception gap: Judicial corruption and institutional distrust in Croatia Sophia E. Taskov Introduction Trust in government institutions, in particular the judiciary, serves as a fundamental currency of a functioning democracy. Its absence produces political instability, economic costs, and social fragmentation (OECD, 2024). Yet, in the Republic of Croatia, this democratic currency has been devalued by not only real judicial malpractice but also a persistent overestimation of how corrupt everyday governance actually is. This distrust is not a cultural artifact or temporary mindset, rather a systemic issue rooted in the country’s history and political development. Croatia formed part of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) from 1945 until its dissolution in the early 1990s. The legacy of that era still casts a shadow over the institutions of today, especially on the judiciary. Under Yugoslav socialism, political power was centralized and authoritarian (Ramet, 2006), resulting in a system where transparency did not exist and public accountability was subordinated to party loyalty. Croatia’s transition to independence and accession to the EU did not fully erase these patterns; it translated them into new institutional practices and deepened public suspicion. This article argues that although judicial corruption exists and is serious, citizens’ perception of its prevalence significantly exceeds their direct experience, creating a hyperbolized distrust that can be just as damaging as corruption itself, deterring citizens from engaging with public institutions and weakening their belief that meaningful change is possible. Mistrust in government, then, becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, where people assume the system is irredeemably corrupt, withdraw from civic and legal channels, and undermine (or ignore) institutions they no longer trust. Croatia’s government has committed to fighting corruption, signaling intent to satisfy EU benchmarks. Evidence and public sentiment suggest, however, that the government’s efforts are often viewed as superficial. The consequences constitute a triple threat to the nation’s stability, in political, economic, and social spheres. Politically, governance is destabilized when citizens no longer believe that courts can restrain those in power. Economically, development suffers when the rule of law is perceived as unpredictable, deterring foreign investment and favoring political influence over market efficiency (European Commission, 2011). Socially, cohesion erodes, with a sense of learned helplessness becoming embedded in citizens, leading them to believe that outcomes are predetermined by patronage versus merit. This article traces the history of judicial distrust, analyzes its consequences through the perception gap, and proposes a reform roadmap. From Yugoslavia to independence and EU integration Contemporary distrust in Croatian government institutions has its origins in the country’s political development. Although Croatia’s political and legal status changed dramatically as it transitioned from a socialist republic to an independent state and then a member of the EU, the underlying structures of informal power have proved remarkably resilient. These structures emerged under Yugoslav socialism, persisted during the Homeland War, and were reinforced by the politicized privatization in the 1990s. Together, they generated the disconnect between formal reforms and public belief in the rule of law. Croatia faces a hyperbolized trust deficit, where citizens’ perception of judicial corruption significantly exceeds their direct experience. This distrust is rooted in Yugoslav-era patronage (veze) and 1990s cronyism that have persisted through the EU-mandated reforms. High-profile scandals that involve grand corruption and systemic bias reinforce narratives of elite impunity, deter investment, and weaken social cohesion. To restore institutional legitimacy, Croatia must implement rigorous auditing, digital transparency, and independent civilian oversight. doi:10.18275/pbe-v044-003
RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy MTA0OTQ5OA==