The article explores the effect of European Union directives and electricity market liberalization on France’s nuclear power production and electricity independence. Did France diversify power generation? Yes, France diversified power generation, but nuclear facilities continue to provide about 70% of France’s power (World…,2024). The other 30% is from renewable sources, which include: wood, hydraulic, biofuels, wind, heat pumps, renewable waste, biogas, solar, geothermal, agriculture, and marine (International…,2023). In 2014, a government policy aimed to decrease reliance on nuclear energy in France by reducing the nuclear electricity generation from 70% to 50% by 2025. However, in 2019, after a reassessment, the target date for achieving this goal was delayed to 2035. Then in 2023, this goal was entirely abandoned, indicating France’s willingness to continue using nuclear energy as its primary power source (World…, 2024). Further diversification of sources is hindered by the fact that nuclear energy is a source of national pride in France. Nevertheless, France’s nuclear energy output will significantly decrease in the coming years because climate change is creating environmental challenges— such as warmer water sources, water shortages, and temperature restrictions on discharged water—that inhibit the ability to cool nuclear reactors in water efficiently. This is detrimental because alternatives can be expensive and require significant time and maintenance. Additionally, nuclear energy’s future seems uncertain because of the very different opinions of the three leading political coalitions that must share power after France’s recent presidential and parliamentary elections (Energy…, 2024). Has France remained independent in energy production despite being part of the EU? Yes, France has remained energy independent, but also has had to adapt to the policies set by the EU for member countries. After joining the EU, France was slow to apply EU regulations, including those dealing with international energy, climate, and energy markets. In fact, France’s continuing energy independence can in part be attributed to its reluctance to adopt certain regulations, such as the energy policy coming out of Brussels, which aims to reduce energy consumption throughout the EU by 11.7%. France has been slow to adopt this framework because it clashes with the belief that ensuring energy supply is a public welfare responsibility. French retail electricity rates are lower than elsewhere in the EU. France also faces systemic constraints. The country’s energy sector is composed mainly of its aging nuclear power reactors and low prices limit investment in alternatives. Though remaining independent in energy production, France is nevertheless working towards the EU’s goals by developing policies that transition energy production and consumption towards climate sustainability (Engels, 2023). References Energy Intelligence (July 12, 2024). France: elections leave nuclear ambitions up in the air. Engels, F. (2023). The French (non-) compliance with the European energy policy. Z Politikwiss 33. doi.org/10.1007/s41358-022-00329-z International Trade Administration (2023, February 3). France - country commercial guide. US Department of Commerce. World Nuclear Association (2024, May 21). Nuclear power in France. Retrospective by Isabel Carino-Bazan ’25 Molecular biology and economics November 2024 France, Austria-Switzerland, Germany Edition Martindale Retrospectives Martindale Center for the Study of Private Enterprise Lehigh University College of Business Rauch Business Center, 621 Taylor Street, Bethlehem, PA 18015-3117 Tel: +1.610.758.4771 | Fax: +1.610.758.6549 | www.lehigh.edu/martindale Retrospective on Melissa McAloose, “Nuclear Power in France” from France in a New Europe Perspectives on Business and Economics, Volume 15, 1997 Melissa (McAloose) Barnaby ‘97 is employed at Circles North America.
Retrospective on Sarah Verbosky, “Immigration in France: The Economics and Politics of a Sensitive Issue” from France in a New Europe Perspectives on Business and Economics, Volume 15, 1997 Sarah (Verbosky) Luck ‘97 is now employed as Senior Research Manager, Packing at Church & Dwight Co., Inc. The author examined the benefits and costs of France instituting strict anti-immigration policies prior to 1997. Has France instituted more immigration policies since 1997? Yes, France has instituted several immigration policies since 1997. A key one is a 1998 law, inspired by US visa policy, that eased requirements for entry into France for certain highly skilled professionals, such as scientists and scholars. The 1998 immigration law was set in place because France was behind countries such as Germany and the United Kingdom in attracting high skilled foreign human capital (Guiraudon, 2001). France passed another immigration bill in 2018 that “shortens asylum application deadlines, doubles the time for which illegal migrants can be detained, and introduces a one-year prison sentence for entering France illegally” (France approves…, 2018). These 2018 immigration reforms were controversial, with critics arguing that the reforms placed too much emphasis on tightening border controls and reducing asylum processing times at the expense of humanitarian considerations. In 2024, France published another immigration law with amendments on residency and citizenship and stricter policies on immigration. Despite censure from protests, the law was enacted, reflecting the government's commitment to reforms restricting immigration. The bill passed the national assembly 349 votes in favor to 186 against (France: new, 2024). Has there been a change in sentiment towards immigrants in France? In the late 1990s, the French approach to immigration was relatively more open, focusing on integration and multiculturalism. However, the early 2000s saw increasing concerns about immigration, fueled by changing economic conditions in France and high-profile political debates. The French approach today is shaped by a combination of security concerns, economic considerations, and national identity. France has tightened its immigration policies, particularly in response to security concerns. Events like the 2015 Paris attacks also intensified debates about immigration. The rise of extremist parties with stronger views on immigration have also influenced public sentiment. “The most recent U.S. News Best Countries survey found that French attitudes about increasing immigrant levels were among the most negative out of 36 countries surveyed” (Davis, 2024). France has tightened its immigration policies, particularly in response to security concerns. The government has created stricter border controls for asylum seekers and migrants. Immigration has become a more polarizing issue in Europe since the turn of the 21st century, and countries like France have shifted towards more extremist views on the issue. References Davis, E. Jr. (2024, January 25). 3 questions about France’s immigration law backlash, answered. US News. France approves controversial immigration bill. (2018, April 23). BBC. France: new comprehensive immigration law introduced. (2024, March 11). Fragomen. Guiraudon, V. (2001, July 1). Immigration policy in France. Brookings. Retrospective by Randi Conroy ‘25 Finance, with mass communication minor 2 Martindale Retrospectives November 2024
Martindale Retrospectives Retrospective on Amy Di Stasio, Switzerland: Has Neutrality Reached Its Limits?” from Austria and Switzerland at the Crossroads Perspectives on Business and Economics, Volume 18, 2000 Amy (Di Stasio) Nehlsen is Executive Director, Air Separation Unit Product Line at Air Products in Allentown. The author discusses the history of neutrality, the implications of neutrality for the country, and why it is important to reinterpret the policies of neutrality. Has Switzerland become a full member of the EU? Writing in 2000, (Di Stasio) Nehlson suggested European Union accession as an important next step for Switzerland, arguing that membership in the EU would not affect most aspects of the country’s neutrality. Although closely tied to the EU through various agreements, to this day Switzerland has not joined. The article reviews Switzerland’s long tradition of neutrality and non-alignment in international affairs. This stance has shaped its approach to EU integration. While there were formal talks regarding advancement of Switzerland's involvement in the EU, the discussions fell short of agreement. “Between 2014 and 2021, the EU and Switzerland negotiated an institutional framework agreement, which should have secured and further developed Switzerland’s participation in the EU internal market. In May 2021, the Swiss government unilaterally terminated these talks” (The European…, 2021). Swiss citizens and policymakers remained concerned that EU membership could compromise the country's neutrality. Nevertheless, according to the EU’s website, Switzerland and the EU share many values. They support each other in a variety of areas, including climate change, promoting human rights, and combating poverty. Is neutrality still advantageous to Switzerland? Switzerland has been neutral since 1515. Its neutrality has contributed to its stability and security, assuring it does not get dragged into conflicts from neighboring countries. Recent polls suggest that “A majority (57%) of the Swiss population is still in favor of Switzerland's differential policy of neutrality, i.e., it should take a political stand but be militarily neutral” (Tresch, 2023). This response comes after the RussiaUkraine conflict, which prompted Switzerland to rethink its complete neutrality. Another survey suggests that a slight majority (55%) is “in favour of re-exporting Swiss-made war materiel to Ukraine” (Small…, 2024). Currently, this is prohibited in Switzerland. Unless the country is fighting under a UN mandate, the sale of arms to other countries is illegal. Although still neutral, Switzerland has sided with the EU in sanctions against Russia. In July 2024, Switzerland deepened sanctions in response to Russia’s ongoing military aggression against Ukraine (Ukraine…, 2024). Switzerland's neutrality continues to succeed in maintaining stability, even as the nation navigates the complexities brought by the RussiaUkraine conflict. There are no signs of an end to Switzerland’s neutrality. References The European Union and Switzerland. (2021, July 30). Delegation of the European Union to Switzerland and Liechtenstein. Small majority of Swiss back re-exporting arms to Ukraine. (2024, January 28). SWI swissinfo.ch. Ukraine: Switzerland adopts further sanctions against Russia. (2024, July 9). Federal Department of Economic Affairs, Education and Research, Switzerland. [Press Release]. Tresch, T. S. (2023, March 16). Survey security 2023. ETH Zurich. Retrospective by Randi Conroy ‘25 Finance, with mass communication minor 3 November 2024
Retrospective on Mereille Najm, “The Price of Resolution: Switzerland and the Holocaust Victims” from Austria and Switzerland at the Crossroads Perspectives on Business and Economics, Volume 18, 2000 Mereille (Najm) Ziade is an account manager at Monalisa Fashions, Inc. in Allentown, PA. The author discusses how Switzerland’s banking system came under scrutiny regarding its role during the Holocaust. Swiss banks held many dormant accounts for Holocaust victims and survivors. How has the Swiss bank restitution payment benefited Holocaust victims and survivors? A 1998 restitution settlement led to creation of the Swiss Bank Settlement Fund, to process and resolve claims from Holocaust survivors and their families. Totaling $1.25 billion, “over 458,400 Holocaust victims and their heirs in every U.S. state, and in more than 80 nations” (Gribetz, J. & Reig, 2020) were paid restitution. A portion was for payments to refugees who had been turned away from the Swiss border. “From December 2001 through early 2005, the Claims Conference paid a total of $10.6 million to 3,858 former refugees” (Swiss…, 2016). Before the payment, that group of refugees had not been formally recognized. It brought light to the stories of thousands of Holocaust survivors. Each victim who received payment also had a small story published about their experience. “Jewish Holocaust survivors who were denied entry into, or expelled from, Switzerland, received $3,625 [each]” (Swiss…, 2016). The funding was also used for humanitarian and educational programs to shed light on Holocaust victims and survivors, as well as preservation, historical research, and documentation. This furthered understanding the extent of—and better addressing—the injustices. Have all dormant Swiss bank accounts from the Holocaust been uncovered? In short, no, not all dormant Swiss bank accounts from the Holocaust era have been uncovered. While significant progress has been made, it is difficult to say definitively that all such accounts have been identified and resolved. In February 2001, a few months after this article was published, the Claims Resolution Tribunal (CRT) published “names of the owners of approximately 21,000 accounts that probably or possibly belonged to victims of Nazi persecution” (Claims…, 2024). Today, the CRT of the Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation is closed. The website is maintained by the US Holocaust Memorial Museum. In December 2015, a new policy was enacted that requires Swiss banks to “publish the names of any client with whom they have had no contact for the past 60 years, provided their account holds at least CHF500” (Allen, 2024). Swiss banks have continued to identify remaining dormant accounts and to reach out to potential claimants. This can include working with organizations dedicated to Holocaust remembrance and restitution. References Allen, M. (2024, January 28). Swiss publish dormant bank account list. SWI swissinfo.ch. Claims resolution tribunal. (2024) EHRI Portal. Copywrite EHRI Consortium 2024. Gribetz, J. & Reig, S.C. (2020, April 14). Swiss Banks Settlement: In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation – Overview. 2006-2007 Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation (Swiss Banks) CV-96- 9849. Swiss banks settlement: refugee class. (2016, March 1). Claims Conference: Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany. Retrospective by Randi Conroy ‘25 Finance, with mass communication minor Martindale Retrospectives 4 November 2024
Martindale Retrospectives 5 November 2024 Retrospective on Christopher Hok-Hoi Tam, “Acceptance or Alienation: Foreigners in a Reunited Germany” from The Continuing Challenges of German Reunification Perspectives on Business and Economics, Volume 16, 1998 Christopher Hok-Hoi Tam ‘98 is a doctor of psychiatry at Ontario Shores Centre for Mental Health Sciences, in Ontario, Canada. Tam discussed Germany’s historically low naturalization rate and reasons behind the country’s declaration as a “non-immigrant” country. Have immigration laws changed in Germany since 1998? Since publication of this article in 1998, Germany’s immigration views and policies have evolved. Recently, the German cabinet has enacted citizenship reforms. Draft new laws would enable foreigners to obtain German citizenship without giving up their current citizenship. This would allow dual citizenship, something not previously available to immigrants. “The government also intends to make procedures for applying for citizenship easier, claiming that the move will mark ‘a new beginning in migration and integration policy as is right for a modern country of immigration’” (Symons, 2023). There was an influx following Brexit, with a high of 128,900 foreigners becoming German citizens in 2019. In addition, the 2020 Skilled Immigration Act and its recent modifications aim to mitigate labor shortages in Germany by making it easier for non-EU skilled workers to enter the country for work. It is estimated that these reforms could increase non-EU workers in Germany by 60,000 per year. As of 2023, there were an estimated 1.74 million job vacancies throughout Germany (Logan, 2023). Nancy Faeser, Interior Minister for the coalition government “called the reform an acknowledgment of a modern Germany ''(Logan, 2023). This is one of the most important reform projects from the coalition to date. These reforms will encourage more immigrants to enter Germany. How has the perception of Auslander (foreigners) shifted since 1998? In 1998, Germany was still experiencing nonnegligible degrees of xenophobia towards foreigners and immigrants. However, far-right, anti-immigration extremist parties are becoming less prevalent in Germany. Immigration skepticism remains evident but has declined. One survey in 2022 found that “Germans are more optimistic about migration and immigration than they were a few years ago” (Witting & Hänel, 2022). Many Germans realize the importance of immigration for the economy: 66% of respondents to the survey believe that immigration helps to balance an aging society; 50% also said that immigrants can help with the shortage of skilled workers and expect immigrants to bring additional revenue for Germany’s pension fund (Witting & Hänel, 2022). Because of the labor shortage, Germany has incentives to open its doors to more immigrants to stimulate the workforce and economy. An anticipated “13 million workers will leave the labor market over the next 15 years, almost a third of all currently available workers. The Federal Employment Agency estimates that 400,000 new immigrants will be needed annually to compensate for the shrinkage of the German workforce” (Boutelet, 2023). Because of the competitive nature of Europe's economy, immigrants are valued more than ever. References Boutelet, C. (2023, March 6). Germany, facing labor shortage, plans reform to become an “immigration” society. Le Monde. Logan, O. (2023, August 23). Dual citizenship law passes through German cabinet. IamExpat. Symons, A. (2023, June 21). Moving to Germany will be easier in 2024 under a new visa scheme. euronews.travel. Witting, V., & Hänel, L. (2022, February 16). Germans less skeptical of immigration. DW. Retrospective by Randi Conroy ‘25 Finance, with mass communication minor
Retrospective on Adrienne Shannon, “German Investment in Russia” from The Continuing Challenges of German Reunification Perspectives on Business and Economics, Volume 16, 1998 Adrienne (Shannon) Thompson currently lives in the Washington D.C. area. (Shannon) Thompson analyzed Germany’s investments in Russia and the two nations’ deep economic and political ties. She then assessed Germany’s path forward in relations with Russia. How has German business with Russia shifted since 1998? At the turn of the 21st century, Germany and Russia had a stable business and economic relationship. They were large trading partners and Germany was heavily investing in Russia’s energy projects such as the construction of the Nord Stream pipeline, which delivers natural gas from Russia to Germany. Many business ties between the two countries have been severed since the start of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Germany has been a main driver of sanctions against Russia. “German history reveals how important it is, amid all of this, to expose and punish those responsible for crimes against humanity, to dismantle dictatorial institutions, and reflect deeply as a nation on one's own guilt” (Baunov, 2023). Because of EU and German sanctions, many German businesses with significant investments in Russia, such as Volkswagen, have pulled out entirely. The Coalition for Ukraine has been tracking over one thousand German companies with branches in Russia. They have found at least 953 that have or are pulling out (Algard, 2024). Does Germany still rely on Russia’s natural resources and energy? Germany has relied heavily on Russia’s abundant natural resources, including coal, oil, timber, and precious metals. Russia has been Germany’s primary source of natural resource imports for decades. The first pipeline connecting Siberia to Germany was completed in the early 1980s. Germany previously imported half of its natural gas and a third of its oil from Russia. However, trade between the two countries has become a topic of debate since the start of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2022. Since September 2022, there has been no direct natural gas imports from Russia to Germany (Germany…, 2024). Sanctions against Russia have led Germany to turn to other sources for energy and natural resources. “Norway replaced Russia as Germany's top gas supplier in 2022, accounting for a third of imports. Belgium and the Netherlands also helped plug the gap” (Eckert & Steitz, 2023). Since the start of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Germany has significantly reduced their reliance on Russia for natural resources. References Algard, A. (2024, September). Corporations supporting Ukraine: An accounting of who’s pulling out and who’s continuing business with Russia. Coalition for Ukraine. Baunov, A. (2023, June 7). Russia,“The West” and Germany - Taking stock and looking ahead. Carnegie Politika. Eckert, V. & Steitz, C. (2023, January 20). Explainer: Where does Germany stand on gas supply? Reuters. Germany natural gas imports from Russia. (2024, September 17). Trading Economics. Retrospective by Randi Conroy ‘25 Finance, with mass communication minor . Martindale Retrospectives 6 November 2024
www.lehigh.eduRkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy MTA0OTQ5OA==