74 PERSPECTIVES ON BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS | VOL 42 | 2024 two decades. Protests intensified in 2011, and over the next few years they occupied land and buildings, shut down water services, and organized across social media. Their demands included an independent environmental impact study, termination of government exploitation of their water resources, provision for local jobs, and the establishment of a school and a hospital, most of which are long-standing demands of the Amazigh people across rural Morocco. A negotiating committee was elected to meet with representatives of the royal family, but after 16 meetings, the negotiations came to a halt and the suppression of activists began again. Still, the movement managed to stop 3 million tons of water from reaching the mine by 2018 and had closed one of the main water valves (Mayet, 2022). This movement was classified as the longest sit-in in Africa’s modern history. A new wave of protests, the Hirak, erupted in the Rif region in 2016, in which the people mobilized against the government in an initially peaceful movement. Led by Nasser Zafzafi, the protests were sparked by the death of Muhsin Fikri, a fisherman who was crushed by a garbage truck after trying to retrieve his confiscated products (Masbah, 2017). Protestors made developmental and political demands and put pressure on the government to invest in improving the region’s shortcomings: unemployment, poverty, and corruption. Rifans framed their activism in terms of regional identity and often flew the flag of the short-lived Rif Republic (1921–1926) alongside the Amazigh banner in place of the Moroccan flag, indicating a clear popular discontent with the Moroccan authorities. Compared to the Arab and Berber Spring uprisings, these protests were far more successful in garnering support and maintaining longevity. Part of this success can be attributed to the movement’s ability to establish a shared identity among the community, one that was built on the themes of injustice, marginalization, and the common Amazigh identity. This common identity only burnt a stronger desire for justice when authorities continued to repress protests and hinder the implementation of these demands (Masbah, 2017). In response to the isolation felt by Imazighen communities, The Moroccan Association for Research and Cultural Exchange emerged as the first Amazigh cultural association in Morocco. It was founded in 1967 by Imazighen activists who believed that their identity in Morocco was being reduced to an exotic relic of the country’s ancient history (Maddy-Weitzman, 2012). The term Amazigh translates to “free people,” indicating their desire for sovereignty that never came to fruition. Still, the sentiment of separation is prevalent, and Imazighen communities are often treated by observers as an ethnic group (Lefèvre, 2016). Creating identity through education and language Today, there are three Imazighen languages spoken in Morocco. The most prominent, Tashelhit, is spoken by 8 million people, and Tamazight and Tarrifit are each spoken by about three million people. The word, Tamazight, is often used as an umbrella term to generally denote languages spoken by the Imazighen population. These numbers reflect a modern, postcolonial population whose language was generationally stripped from them. The percentage of Tamazight-speaking Moroccans has dropped by approximately 50% since the French Protectorate was introduced roughly 100 years ago (Maddy-Weitzman, 2012). Additionally, the domains in which Tamazight is used have become limited to the household and among friends mostly in rural and mountainous areas (Ennaji, 1997). Language has been one of the central factors in solidifying recognition for Imazighen communities and has been equally important in the establishment of national Arab identity (Maddy-Weitzman, 2012). These opposing ideologies came to a head in the Moroccan postcolonial era. After independence, acknowledgement of Tamazight as a widely spoken language in Morocco was rare. In 1994, King Hassan II announced the national recognition of three variations of Imazighen languages, which set the stage for an opportunity to create real legislative change. In 1999, Tamazight obtained the status of a school subject and went on to be implemented five years later into the educational curriculum of rural communities (Meskine & de Ruiter, 2015). Beginning in September 2004, for the first time ever, Imazighen students were required to study Tamazight in public schools in parts of rural Morocco. These regions included the Rif, Middle Atlas, High Atlas, and Sous Valley. Such study was made possible by King Mohammed VI’s establishment of the Royal Institute of Amazigh Culture in 2001, which indicated a clear shift in popular sentiment towards the Amazigh language and culture. The masses no longer viewed Amazigh culture as a threat to national identity or a hindrance to Moroccan unity; rather, the promotion of it became a sign of progress in embracing and promoting social diversity in the country (Silverstein & Crawford, 2004). The king took this a step further in 2011, when he made amendments to the Moroccan Constitution, in reaction to the rising tensions and protests during the
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