73 MARTINDALE CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE bic the official language and Islam the state religion (Maddy-Weitzman, 2012). In doing so, Moroccan nationalists, compared to the French, implemented a complete antithetical policy of national integration and assimilation in the name of building a strong, united independent state at the expense of Amazigh culture. The ruling elite believed that this was the only way to be successful in state building and national integration. In 1968, 12 years after Moroccan Independence, the Kingdom’s official historian, Abd al-Wahab Ben Mansour, had a vision of erasing Amazigh identity all together, facilitated by the natural path of modernization in Morocco. He expressed the sentiment that “Bringing an Arabized education system to the country…would result…in the disappearance of Berber within fifty years” (Maddy-Weitzman, 2012, p. 90). This sentiment was widely shared in Moroccan postindependence, and even if it was not explicitly stated, there were implicit efforts and calls to immerse the Imazighen population in a larger Arabized society. Resistance and reaction over time Historically, the Amazigh population has always resisted attempts to dilute their cultural and linguistic heritage. The Amazigh movement has been vocal in the decades after Moroccan independence, demanding official linguistic and cultural recognition and challenging the push for full Arabization of Moroccan society. The recognition offered to Imazighen communities in the past decades, notably the 2011 constitutional amendment providing linguistic recognition, has given the Amazigh movement a sense of confidence to further press their demands (Maddy-Weitzman, 2012). Ultimately, the demands of this movement include recognizing the existence of the modern Amazigh people as a collective and acknowledging their historical and cultural impact in North Africa. Activists are adamant about making Tamazight equal to Arabic, elevating it to the modern status along with seeking a plan to address the marginalization of Amazigh people in educational, social, and economic spheres and policies (Maddy-Weitzman, 2012). In the Rif region specifically, demands are more concrete, including the establishment of a hospital and a university, royal-sanctioned investment in infrastructure projects, and demilitarization of the region (Wolf, 2019). The often-neglected Rif region has a history of resistance and rebellion dating back to the colonial period in Africa (Masbah, 2017). The Rifans maintained independence briefly between 1921 and 1926 under the leadership of Muhammad ibn Abd alKarim al-Khattabi but were forced to surrender after a brutal Franco-Spanish campaign. The region was annexed by the Moroccan state after independence; however, this new status only served to heighten tensions between the central authorities and the local population. The Rif region was highly underrepresented in the first postindependence government and has often been referred to as Bled es-Siba, meaning land of dissidence and chaos (Crivello, 2003). Tensions came to a head in 1958 when locals stormed a branch of a prominent monarchy-aligned political party, along with a post office, assaulting the employees. The monarchy sent 20,000 troops to repress the rebellion, which proved to be a bloody operation in which 3000 locals died. After the suppression of this rebellion, the Rif was declared a military zone, establishing a deliberate marginalization of the region, both politically and economically (Wolf, 2019). A critical moment for the Amazigh movement was the Berber Spring, a period of activism in the late 1980s that marked the most prominent challenge to the state-led push for hegemony. However, this movement lacked unity as the Amazigh population was spread across the Atlas Mountains and Rif regions, making it more difficult to promote a common identity. In 1994, Imazighen activists were arrested and convicted for promoting their identity. This event allegedly embarrassed King Hassan II and led him to partially embrace Amazigh heritage and pledge that Tamazight would begin to be taught in schools, which was actualized under his successor, Mohammed VI. To justify this about-face and maintain a united front, the King said in a speech in 1994, “there is not one of us who cannot be sure that there is in his dynasty, blood or body a small or large amount of cells which came from an origin which speaks one of Morocco’s dialects” (Sater, 2007, p. 141). This pronouncement was largely figurative since no action was taken during the remaining five years of his reign. Still, it provided the stimulus for Imazighen movements to make an increasing impact on the Moroccan public sphere (Maddy-Weitzman, 2012). Another notable movement was the Movement on the Road 96 in August 2011, a few months after the Arab Spring uprisings. It began when activists from the area of Imider climbed Mount Alebban in the High Atlas and shut down a pipeline that was diverting water from their region to a mine linked to a private company of the Moroccan royal family. Protestors had been voicing their concerns over damage to crops and the environment, food and water insecurity, dust storms, and loss of biodiversity for
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