20 PERSPECTIVES ON BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS | VOL 42 | 2024 economic disparities, set up the main issue of collective land: is it best to keep the current land system or push toward privatization? King Mohammed VI has clearly chosen privatization. These conceptions of underdevelopment and inequality inspired him, in an address regarding real estate, to encourage the privatization of collective land (King Mohamed VI’s..., 2015). In fact, many attempts have been made in the past to commercialize Moroccan collective land. The first sustained effort began in the 1960s, spearheaded by the World Bank. Claiming much of its work was done to prevent the overexploitation of land, the institution has had a major influence on the country’s agricultural policy over the past 40 years, to the point of effectively writing legal code, in the 1990s. The main result was Law 33-94, which governs the development of dry and arable collective land. It states that the utilization of such land is of significant public importance and thus falls under the control of the Moroccan State. The Moroccan government has used this code mainly as a framework for increasing agricultural output, and direct effects can be seen in only a small study area (El Aich & Kiresiewa, 2014). In 2014, five public forums were held between March and May to discuss potential large-scale privatizations (Berriane, 2017). With the country eagerly awaiting possible change, nothing ever materialized due to the polarization of the topic. Morocco was left waiting until July 2019, when the Committee on the Interior passed three new reforms dealing with the privatization process (Chaudier, 2023). Much to the alarm of indigenous peoples, these reforms simplified the process for privatizing land. Previously, the state, which was the sole party allowed to purchase collective land, would have to prove that privatization would bring benefits from development. Once purchased, such land could be transferred from the state to a private party. After the 2019 laws, however, land can be transferred or leased to anyone irrespective of development benefits, as long as there is mutual agreement between village administrators and the private party (Chaudier, 2023). Often, even this requirement could be overcome. The rationale for development, for example, in support of tourism, which in 2019 made up 7% of Moroccan GDP and is expected to grow further, is certainly sound (OECD, 2022). However, cases of expropriation since the 2019 laws show that current privatization and governmental expropriation methods are not sustainable solutions to the complex challenges of modernizing communal land. For example, in the Ouled Sbitra community near the capital of Rabat, the community held beach land and was firmly committed to remaining there. Unwilling to abide by community preference, outside developers argued to the government that the land should be available for sale. The government, bypassing the 2019 law, complicitly complied and then sold the land to Addoha, a Moroccan property developer, so they could build a luxury property complex (Chaudier, 2023), an illustration of how tribes and communities can be defenseless in the face of expropriation. Communities also may not be receiving promised governmental support. Government administration of collective land varies widely across the country, but one commonality is that inhabitants pay taxes, collected by the Ministry of the Interior. The Ministry then redistributes the funds across the territory, investing in public projects for the common benefit of the people living there. This monetary process has led to cases of corruption where the community never experiences the benefit of the tax (Balgley & Rignall, 2015). The land takeover for Ouarzazate, one of the world’s largest solar power plants, further demonstrates the government’s privatization and development preference. This site was once home to an Amazigh (Berber) clan. Social anthropologist Sarah Ryser (2019) collected accounts from the semi- nomadic herders who inhabited the nearly 3000-hectare land. The solar panel field, and its surrounding enclosure, blocks the herding path along the nearby riverbed. With the path blocked off, it takes much longer to get to the other end, making it costly to find food for the residents’ herds. It also affects the herder’s ability to aid in housework (such as gardening), another negative impact for the families living on this land. The government described the area as a “wasteland” prior to the solar project. Land is labeled as such when deemed not effectively utilized. With the wasteland designation, the government was able to easily expropriate it in 2013 and develop it as a solar field, claiming a win for all parties involved (Ryser, 2019). In reality, herders now have less time for domestic chores, such as caring for their crops or families, and a more difficult time caring for their herd. Prior to the takeover, the government told just three men in charge of collecting rents from the community members that appropriations were to take place (Rignall, 2015). The other inhabitants had no idea that the land was being taken by the government. In this specific case, the collective land of the Ouarzazate was expropriated by the Moroccan Agency for Sustainable Energy (a private company),
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