7 MARTINDALE CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE ments threaten the negotiating power of the Polisario Front. After the resumption of hostilities in 2020, the Polisario Front reported the deaths of four Polisario fighters, including a commander, by a Moroccan drone strike in April 2021 (Congressional Research Service, 2021; Polisario Front’s commander…, 2023). Time is on the side of the Moroccans, who can afford to wage a low-intensity campaign of suppression against a rapidly fracturing independence movement, whereas unity, and thus their power, appears to be slipping away from the Sahrawis. The situation has become increasingly perilous, with the possibility of splinter groups or individual Sahrawis seeking to renew the violence, making use of connections with Islamic extremist groups as allies of convenience. Addressing the Western Sahara problem To inhibit developments like religious extremism and violent outbursts among the Sahrawis, the Moroccan government must demonstrate its willingness to make good faith efforts at negotiating with the Polisario Front. Ending the political persecution and civil rights abuses of Sahrawis within the Moroccan-controlled zone of Western Sahara and a hiatus on drone strikes in the Polisario-controlled areas will help to ease tensions. The Moroccans may be content to allow the Polisario Front to splinter, but it would not be in their long-term interest to encourage disunity among the Sahrawis, given the existing black-market connections and tangential extremist acquaintances they have made. However, without credible commitments from the Polisario Front, the Moroccans would be ceding their position of strength on their side of the wall without any benefit. The Polisario Front must then commit to halting political agitations and demonstrations. Additionally, the Polisario Front must bring the Algerians to the negotiating table to affirm that while the Polisario Front is not a paramilitary organization under the control of Algeria, its status as a government in exile makes them beholden to certain policy desires of their host country. With each party making some concessions—the Moroccans easing pressure on political activists and halting drone strikes, the Polisario Front pausing disruptive demonstrations, and the Algerians accepting some responsibility for their role in perpetuating the dispute—the possibility of cooperation could be opened, both in the case of the Western Sahara question and between Morocco and Algeria directly. The inclusion of African nations, through the continent-inclusive AU in conjunction with the UN MINURSO mission, will help make the negotiations a public and multilateral affair and allow each party to choose from a pool of neutral representatives to join the negotiations. For example, each party directly involved in the dispute could nominate an AU-vetted mediator to form a three-member panel to guide the discussions and navigate through potential deadlock. The UN should also earmark funds for the demining of the eastern side of the protective berm, another tangible demonstration of détente. Allowing the berm and Moroccan troops to remain in place will balance the demining process. Additionally, the Polisario Front should allow the UN to impound remaining heavy military equipment in their stockpiles, such as tanks, armored cars, and infantry fighting vehicles. This impounding represents a tangible concession on the part of the Polisario Front, temporarily giving up their offensive capabilities but not prohibiting them from reclaiming their equipment should the negotiations allow for a Sahrawi gendarmerie. Once each side has given some, the negotiations must address the question of whether autonomy or independence is the end goal. The Moroccans see Western Sahara as an integral part of their territory that was severed by colonial powers and is now kept from them by those same powers in the name of Algeria and the Polisario Front. Hence, the Moroccans are willing to offer autonomy and nothing more. The Polisario Front, seeing themselves as a distinct people from the Moroccans, will accept nothing less than full independence. A modified approach is best taken at this point. The Polisario Front must be willing to accept autonomy in the short term for the possibility of independence in the long term. It is still unclear whether Western Sahara is economically viable without Moroccan subsidies and investment, and the Polisario Front government would be ill equipped to deal with a fully independent nation immediately. Using the framework of the AU Agenda 2063, which includes language about self-determination—“An Africa of Good Governance, Democracy, Respect for Human Rights, Justice and the Rule of Law” and “A Peaceful and Secure Africa”—the process of autonomy and the inclusion of the Sahrawis must be democratic and completed through the AU in order to demonstrate that African problems can be solved peacefully by Africans (AU, 2024). The stabilization of the Western Sahara dispute would contribute to longer-term regional stability and serve as a guide for unstable countries in North and West Africa. The process of autonomy must be progressive. Setting goals and milestones, such as registration of Sahrawis on tribal rolls, establishment of local Sahrawi governing bodies, and creation of a Sahrawi
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