5 MARTINDALE CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE selves as sovereign agents. Further complications entail broader Moroccan–Algerian border and trade issues, which are costing both nations a great deal of growth and security. Resolving the Western Sahara conflict, although separable, will necessarily entail resolution of what Moroccans perceive as a larger Algerian problem. The Moroccan–Algerian problem The current lack of cooperation between Algeria and Morocco is detrimental to the economies and peoples of both nations. Each country has resources the other needs: the Moroccan agricultural economy requires Algerian oil, and the Algerian petroleum economy needs Moroccan foodstuffs (Elkins, 2020). Despite the closed border arrangement, a burgeoning cross-border, black-market trade in food and oil has sprung up, demonstrating that the impetus for trade exists and could provide a common revenue stream for both nations. The illicit nature of this trade also opens opportunities for goods other than food and oil, commonly Moroccan marijuana and Algerian counterfeit cigarettes but increasingly narcotics, weapons, and people destined for Europe, to become highly sought-after commodities, further entrenching the trade as an illegal operation that is aided by the lack of cooperation between Morocco and Algeria (Boukhars, 2019; Global Organized Crime Index, 2023a, 2023b). Cross-border trafficking has become an accepted fact of life for two governments that otherwise would face an alternative prospect of civil unrest, terrorism, and religious extremism. Corruption also enriches local officials and revives depressed border towns, creating further incentives for Moroccan security forces to turn a blind eye to smugglers, as long as the traffickers refrain from engaging in the arms trade (Boukhars, 2019). Since the 2011 Arab Spring and the collapse of Muammar Gaddafi’s Libya into near-anarchy, Morocco took steps to enhance border security for fear of proliferation of arms, terrorism, and human trafficking along existing smuggling routes. However, these measures, while partially effective at reducing illicit trade, were taken unilaterally, causing land disputes and merely altering the methods, routes, and products being smuggled, pushing fuel smugglers to traffic in narcotics and humans. Cities in Eastern Algeria serve as stepping-off points for illegal sub-Saharan immigrants who typically cross into Algeria from Niger. The flow of illegal immigration into Morocco has increased since the “regularization” of more than 25,000 illegal immigrants by order of Moroccan King Mohammed VI in 2014 in an attempt to combat human trafficking and ease policies on asylum seekers (Boukhars, 2019; Saddiki, 2020; Schuettler, 2017). Morocco is a highly sought-after transit country because of already-established drug smuggling routes into Europe and the fact that Morocco shares the only African land border with a European country: Spain’s Ceuta and Melilla exclaves, both located along Morocco’s Mediterranean coast. Other products crossing from Algeria into Morocco include amphetamines, psychotropics, and counterfeit prescription drugs, the last of which are the leading cause of poisoning in Morocco, demonstrating a distinct health threat to the Moroccan public (Boukhars, 2019). Morocco and Algeria are taking their own steps to curb the illegal trade across their borders, but their security forces are not collaborating, resulting in limited success. Smugglers and traffickers, in turn, have been free to work within the blind spots created by the essentially nonexistent communication between Morocco and Algeria. Under the current system, goods traded between Morocco and Algeria must first travel to the port of Marseille, France. If Morocco and Algeria traded directly with each other, rather than giving in to their divisive regional rivalry, their economies would have doubled in size between 2005 and 2015, according to the World Bank. Instead, with a focus on building barriers and unilaterally securing borders during that period, the Moroccan economy has grown by only 37% (Mhidi, 2017). The slowed rate of growth is unable to tame high rates of unemployment among young people, especially in the border regions of Northeastern Morocco, where approximately 70% of the economy depends on the informal sector. Efforts made by the Moroccan government at securing the border with Algeria and the closure of smuggling routes put young people, whose only economic opportunities lie in the black market, out of jobs. Without opportunities provided to them in the formal sector by the government, young people and their families are often forced into poverty, resulting in protests and civil unrest (Boukhars, 2019). Until Morocco and Algeria set aside their disputes, people on both sides of the border will continue to suffer. Ever-increasing flows of people and illegal products, along with the spread of civil unrest and extremism, could be countered more easily if Morocco and Algeria collaborated with a comprehensive security strategy. Trafficking will continue, but a united front would help reduce security risks and promote economic growth for both countries. By bringing existing trading into the formal sector, young people will not need to engage
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