Perspectives Vol42

4 PERSPECTIVES ON BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS | VOL 42 | 2024 arms and equipment to pursue their struggle, until a 1991 cease-fire was called (Hughes, 2001). Algeria closed the border with Morocco entirely in 1994 in the aftermath of a violent attack in Marrakech that the Moroccans blamed on the Algerians (Sadiki, 2020). The closed border arrangement, although porous, exists today and hinders relations and trade between the two countries, resulting in a 2% growth loss for the economies of both nations, equivalent to an annual loss of $16B, according to the International Monetary Fund (Elkins, 2020). After consolidating control over much of Western Sahara by the mid-1970s, Morocco constructed a series of six barrier walls with the help of international technical advisors and military engineers. Construction began in 1980 and ended in 1987 with the completion of earthen berms totaling 1700 miles in length, dotted with defensive fortifications and outposts, and protected by one of the longest continuous minefields in the world on the eastern side, as shown in Figure 1 (Landmine Action, 2012; Saddiki, 2020). While fighting with the Polisario Front continued until 1991, the Western Sahara berm solidified Moroccan control over 80% of the territory and ended what hopes the Polisario Front had of a military solution. Current state of affairs The current problem reveals itself as one of self-determination without a clear solution to the fighting. Without increased support from the Algerians, the Sahrawis have no hope of changing the existing arrangement in a military context and are only able to act in what they claim to be self-defense. UN-led negotiations have stalled, with the Moroccan vision for the development of Western Sahara and the possibility of autonomy causing disagreements about who is eligible to vote in referenda (Lederer, 2021). The UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), which monitors the conflict and conducts mine-clearing operations, has identified five zones within Western Sahara. The first is what amounts to a 5-km-wide demilitarized zone east of the Moroccan berm. On either side of the demilitarized zone are 25-km-wide restricted zones, which are bordered by zones of limited restriction that make up the remainder of Western Sahara. The five zones are observed by 468 UN personnel based out of Laayoune, the largest town in Western Sahara on the Moroccan side of the berm, with a satellite office in Tindouf. The initial UN mandate was established in April 1991, for maintenance of the cease-fire, reduction of Moroccan troop concentrations, separation of Moroccan and Polisario troops, freeing of Western Saharan political prisoners, identification and registration of referendum voters, and facilitation of a free referendum (UN, 2023; UN Peacekeeping, 2023). The mandate has been renewed repeatedly since 2010 due to continued hostilities and the failures of referendum negotiations (Security Council Report, 2023). In November 2020, Morocco launched a military operation into Guerguerat at the southern edge of Western Sahara. The Moroccans claimed the Polisario Front was inhibiting free movement of Moroccan citizens and agricultural exports to Mauritania, the only land border by which Moroccans can leave the country without a visa. Guerguerat lies within the restricted UN zone, meaning the Polisario Front considered the movement of Moroccan troops into the area a cease-fire violation. The Moroccans see the town as vital to the regulation of sub-Saharan migration through Morocco and into Europe, which gives the Moroccans tacit backing of the Europeans for its actions. Critics stated that the UN was neglecting its duties in Western Sahara, and Algeria issued a statement condemning Moroccan violations and reaffirming its support for the Sahrawi people, while also advocating for a negotiated settlement (Morocco troops…, 2020). In July 2021, Moroccan permanent representative to the UN Omar Hilale made a statement that seemingly reversed the Moroccan stance on self-determination, while still denying Sahrawi claims. Hilale advocated for the right of an Algerian separatist movement in the Kabylia region to achieve self-determination and separate from Algeria. This is a sentiment that both highlights Moroccan hypocrisy and outraged the Algerians, who recalled their ambassador, ended diplomatic relations with Morocco, and closed Algerian airspace to Moroccan aircraft. Polisario Front fighters, appearing to become restless in the face of diplomatic failures, have launched sporadic attacks against Moroccan border outposts, indicating a willingness to step up the level of violence (Dworkin, 2022). The Western Sahara conflict seemingly remains intractable, with the Moroccans willing to maintain the status quo, confident they can safely develop the territory behind their border wall while suppressing Sahrawi activists through harassment, detentions and arrests, torture, and raids on activists (Amnesty International, 2021). Solutions must be focused on the possibility of Moroccan–Algerian cooperation, something that is difficult in the context of Western Sahara, as the Moroccans want the Algerians at the negotiating table because they believe the Polisario Front is a function of Algerian statecraft, while the Algerians want the Sahrawis to advocate for them-

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