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Slovenia must promptly strengthen independence of investigations and implement longstanding recommendations, says OECD Working Group on Bribery following high-level mission in Ljubljana [Press release]. in democratic institutions and strengthens the appeal of strongman leaders over independent courts. Economically, it is a hidden tax on investment, especially for small and medium-sized enterprises that cannot afford their own veze. Socially, it destroys trust in institutions, accelerates brain drain, and discourages victims of violence from reporting or pursuing legal action. The fear of corruption becomes as dangerous as corruption itself because it discourages people from using the very legal remedies that could improve institutional performance. High perception of corruption is not only a liability; it also can be a trigger. In other European settings, outrage over state capture mobilized younger generations to demand resignations and structural reform. Croatia’s dynamic is similar. The belief that the system is rigged can either breed apathy or fuel civic pressure for change. Which path prevails will depend on whether institutions can convincingly and visibly demonstrate that powerful actors are no longer above the law. The reforms proposed in this article do not promise a quick cure. They outline a realistic roadmap for tightening the link between formal rules and everyday practice. Implemented together and maintained over time, such measures can begin to close the gap, show that corruption carries real consequences, and restore the sense that seeking justice is rational. In that way, the devalued currency of trust between Croatia and its judicial system can be converted into a more durable, democratic trust grounded in experience, not just hope.
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