90 PERSPECTIVES ON BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS | VOL 44 | 2026 ily utilizing supercooled cargo ships. LNG tankers make deposits at import terminals, where it is then regasified and transported by pipelines or stored (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2024). There are over 30 operational LNG import terminals in Europe, at least 10 more in planning, and several stalled or nonoperational. The US has supplied between 45% and 55% of European LNG since 2023, greater than four times the second largest source, Russia (Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis, 2025). Most terminals in Europe are onshore, but recent initiatives to decrease Russian gas reliance accelerated new commissions and a shift toward FSRUs. More than 10 commissioned or finalized terminals since 2021 have been floating, including the Krk terminal. Krk project history As Figure 1 illustrates, terminal projects on Krk were attempted four times from the 1990s onward, stalled successively by the Croatian War of Independence, the withdrawal of Qatargas, the 2008 financial crisis, and a corruption scandal involving former Prime Minister Ivo Sanader (Kolundžić, 2012). A fifth and final revival in 2016 was shaped significantly by American diplomatic pressure as the US began competing with Russia for European LNG markets (Ilic, 2010; Koranyi, 2018). Following its shale gas revolution, the US actively sought to expand into European energy markets (Koranyi, 2018). Senior American officials identified Croatia as a potential regional energy leader contingent on construction of the Adriatic terminal, and documented exchanges between Croatian and American officials indicate that external pressure played a meaningful role in accelerating the project’s timeline (Harper, 2018). Croatian media and political commentary of the post-2015 period characterized this dynamic explicitly as a function of American strategic interests, reflecting a broader pattern of US energy diplomacy (Lasic, 2016). After years of stalling, diplomatic efforts jump-started funding from the Connecting Europe Facility, Croatian national electricity and gas transmission companies Hrvatska Elektroprivreda (HEP) and Plinacro, and the state budget. The terminal has been contemplated for over three decades; throughout that time, scandal and controversy mounted. In June 2018, responding to American pressure to finalize the project (Harper, 2018), Prime Minister Andrej Plenković announced special legislation to accelerate the timeline, granting LNG Hrvatska a 99-year concession for the marine and land area at the site, exceeding the EU’s fossil fuel phase-out timeline by nearly five decades (Mileta & Simon, 2018). This legislation underwent only 15 days of public debate, despite Croatia’s Environmental Protection Act requiring at least 30 for projects with significant environmental impacts (Re:Common, 2019). Environmental impact assessment (EIA) was rapidly conducted and LNG Hrvatska formed as a joint venture between HEP and Plinacro (Re:Common, 2019). Construction began in 2019, the terminal opened in 2021, and the FSRU expanded in 2025, doubling its storage capacity (LNG Hrvatska, n.d.). Graphic created by author. Note: E.ON is a European natural gas company. Sources: Kolundžić, 2012; Koranyi, 2018; LNG Hrvatska, n.d. Figure 1 Timeline of LNG terminal projects in Croatia, 1990–2025 1990s First consortium 2003 Qatargas conducts market surveys 2004 E.ON rescues project after Qatargas withdraws 2006 Adria LNG consortium formed 2010 Adria LNG shutters 2013 PCI status achieved, FSRU introduced 2015 Corruption scandals stall project 2016 American diplomatic pressure revives project 2018 Special legislation passed, EIA rushed 2021 Terminal completed and operational 2025 FSRU renovated, doubling storage capacity
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