74 PERSPECTIVES ON BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS | VOL 43 | 2025 and military operations depend on subsea cables and satellite networks, although these systems remain highly exposed to potential threats. MODA should improve its cooperation with the Coast Guard Administration and private operators. The development of satellite-based backup systems and cable repair capabilities requires international cooperation with nations like Japan and South Korea. Working with established providers like SES and Eutelsat could accelerate satellite deployment. Such agreements must defend data sovereignty, guarantee access, and enable joint infrastructure development. The imperative to avoid foreign control during crises, especially Chinese influence, makes trusted vendor selection critical—as demonstrated by Taiwan’s excluding Huawei from its 5G networks. Global cyber competition requires Taiwan to dedicate resources to developing post-quantum cryptography, enhancing trust via understandable (i.e., explainable) AI technologies, and ensuring 6G network integrity and software supply chain security. A diverse range of funders are available to support R&D projects, including government agencies, universities, and private sector leaders. Taiwan’s establishment of a cybersecurity innovation hub would serve as a coordination center to manage funding, pilot applications, and accelerate technology commercialization. Taiwan needs to strengthen international technological cooperation despite diplomatic constraints. MODA has to expand Taiwan’s Global Cooperation and Training Framework participation through dedicated tracks on cloud sovereignty, data protection, and disinformation response. Establishing formal bilateral cyber training programs with Taiwan and democratic allies (Japan, Australia, and the Netherlands) should occur as part of regional cybersecurity summits and defense exercises. MODA could also lead the establishment of a digital foreign service corps to deploy cybersecurity specialists in diplomatic missions for technical dialogue, intelligence sharing, and incident response coordination. Taiwan can position itself as a regional leader by providing technical support for Southeast Asian partners regarding digital governance, incident reporting, and cyber hygiene to promote democratic cyber stability in the region. Finally, Taiwan should create a civilian cyber guard reserve corps, modeled after Estonia’s Cyber Defense League. Through this initiative, Taiwan would engage private sector and academic experts to support defense preparedness during emergencies, enabling adaptable and flexible responses. This reserve force would function both as an operational asset and as a potent symbol of citizen unity against cyber threats. Conclusion Taiwan is a powerful global actor that unites democratic governance with digital protection as cyber threats escalate worldwide. The island operates an extensive cybersecurity framework defending against continuous politically motivated attacks on data systems, physical facilities, and information integrity. By implementing advanced technological defenses, civic participation, regulatory reform, and international cooperation, Taiwan has created a decentralized cybersecurity framework enabling robust civil society participation. Within this system, media literacy education is a critical component of defense and security. This democratic digital resilience model contrasts sharply with authoritarian approaches, which makes Taiwan an important research subject. Taiwan’s cybersecurity strategy development requires persistent evolution for sustained effectiveness. The development of quantum computing, generative AI, and hybrid warfare demands adaptation beyond traditional firewalls to include predictive defense and cross-sector collaboration. The success of cybersecurity depends on uniting threat intelligence across multiple domains. Taiwan should keep investing in securing its infrastructure and in training a cybersecurity workforce capable of addressing both technical and ethical challenges. References Albahri, A. A., Yaseen, M. G., Aljanabi, M., Ali, A. H. A. H., & Kaleel, A. (2024). Securing tomorrow: Navigating the evolving cybersecurity landscape. Mesopotamian Journal of CyberSecurity, 4, 1–3. An, A. (2024). Cyberattack on democracy: Escalating cyber threats immediately ahead of Taiwan’s 2024 presidential election. Bauer, F., & Wilson, K. L. (2022). Reactions to China-linked fake news: Experimental evidence from Taiwan. The China Quarterly, 249, 21–46. doi:10.1017/ s030574102100134x Chang, L. Y. (2024). Taiwan: A battlefield for cyberwar and disinformation. Melbourne Asia Review, 2024, 17. Chiang, M. (2023). Taiwan semiconductor manufacturing company: A key chip in the global political economy. East Asian Policy, 15, 36–46. doi:10.1142/ S179393052300003X Chinese vessel cut subsea cable near Taiwan: Report. (2025, January 7). Taipei Times. Chun-hui, Y., & Hetherington, W. (2020, December 28). Presidential office budget for cybersecurity up 50%. Taipei Times.
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