70 PERSPECTIVES ON BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS | VOL 43 | 2025 frastructure, defense supply chains, and high-tech industries. Attackers exploit security weaknesses in the communication networks that civil servants depend on. Information service providers in Taiwan face an enormous surge in attacks, primarily targeting entities that handle official documents, cryptographic tools, and scheduling systems. Critical infrastructure systems encounter increasingly frequent breaches, especially targeting port and highway networks. Bruteforce and ransomware attacks have been documented against academic institutions and research centers. China exploits Internet of Things device vulnerabilities to construct extensive botnets, which develop worldwide covert attack networks. The international group APT41 conducts espionage activities targeting high-tech companies for intellectual property theft. The group identifies and takes advantage of conventional software bugs that affect digital vendors’ products, primarily Cisco, which specializes in networking infrastructure, and Citrix, known for its remote access and virtualization solutions (Secretariat…, 2025). The linked network structure of Taiwan’s critical infrastructure makes it susceptible to complex cyberattacks. Essential services that could be disrupted include energy, water supply, and telecommunications (Jing, 2021). Furthermore, Taiwan’s governance structure faces severe risks from insider attacks, including deliberate and accidental breaches. Workers with access to private data can cause security breaches through accidental exposure or premeditated attacks. Cyber-physical threats The Taiwanese government faces an increasingly difficult challenge protecting its infrastructure from hybrid warfare, which blends conventional physical attacks with cyber operations. Taiwan’s digital infrastructure faces significant risks due to its exposed undersea cables. Ninety-nine percent of Taiwan’s digital communication flows through fiber-optic cables, with global network connectivity maintained through 14 international submarine cables and 10 domestic offshore cables (TeleGeography, 2025). Recent events have underscored the risks that these cables face. In early 2025, the Chinese-controlled Tanzania-flagged vessel Xing Shun 39 intentionally cut subsea cables near Taiwan’s northeastern coast, disrupting external communications (Chinese Vessel Cut Subsea Cable…, 2025). The Togo-flagged Hong Tai 58 vessel, crewed by Chinese sailors, severed Taiwan’s subsea cable connecting Taiwan to Penghu (Lee, 2025). Subsea cables linking Taiwan to the Matsu Islands were cut 12 times in 2023 (Chiang, 2025). The repeated and coordinated nature of these incidents implies that Taiwan’s digital infrastructure is under intentional attack. While China denies involvement, the pattern aligns with Beijing’s dual-use strategy of employing civilian infrastructure—including shipping vessels and cable-laying companies—for geopolitical objectives. The US government halted the Pacific Light Cable Network project because of security concerns regarding Chinese-backed subsea cable infrastructure (United States Department of Justice, 2020). Taiwan has established programs to diversify communication networks and decrease dependence on submarine cables. The government announced a plan to invest NT$40B in developing its low-orbit communication satellite system. The Taiwan Space Agency aims to deploy its first low Earth orbit communications satellite in late 2025, with a second following in 2026 (Po-hsuan, 2023). However, the Taiwanese space initiative has encountered obstacles due to delayed progress and insufficient resources. Meanwhile, the Taiwanese government is developing an alternative defense strategy to combat cyber-physical threats. The Submarine Cable Automatic Warning System now monitors international subsea cables, automatically triggering a warning when vessels approach. The Coast Guard Administration has pledged to enhance port inspections of foreign ships submitting deceptive entry information (Chiang, 2025). Disinformation and the role of the civic tech community Taiwan faces major misinformation and disinformation problems on social media platforms, such as Facebook, Line, and X (formerly Twitter). False information about politics, technological developments, and health issues erodes institutional trust and deepens political divisions. Political disinformation campaigns targeting Taiwan’s elections serve Chinese objectives to damage Taiwan’s democratic system (Wang, 2020). The primary purpose of traditional cybersecurity involves safeguarding systems and data, yet disinformation attacks exploit human social vulnerabilities—with destructive consequences. During the 2024 presidential election in Taiwan, Chinese-origin distributed denial-of-service attacks coincided with extensive disinformation campaigns to discredit President-elect Lai Ching-te and challenge electoral legitimacy (An, 2024). A misinformation attack during Typhoon Jebi in 2018 against Su Chii-cherng, Taiwan’s delegate to Osaka, contributed to his suicide. False reports claimed Taiwanese passengers at Kansai International Airport had to declare Chinese nationality to receive
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