Retrospective on Tamara Nisic, “From Multiculturalism to Integration or from Marginalization to Assimilation?” from Benelux: Integration and Individuality Perspectives on Business and Economics, Volume 26, 2008 Tamara Nisic '08 is an Associate Director at Merck & Co., Inc. Has the Netherlands continued to struggle with integration and assimilation of immigrants into Dutch society? Since 2008, the Netherlands have yet to implement any programs that promote intercultural understanding. Instead, they have attempted to implement a new Civic Integration Act, but thus far it has been delayed twice. “Currently, everyone between the ages of 18 and 65 who migrates to the Netherlands from outside the EU is obliged to take a civic integration exam,” (Eertink, 2020) which consists of general education, learning the Dutch language, and doing voluntary work. The new Civic Integration Act is essentially just a continuation of the integration policies created in the 1990’s meant to assimilate ethnic minorities into Dutch citizens under the guise of aiding them. Even so, the government says it now “wants to strengthen international cultural exchange and cooperation as these nurture us with new influences and images…Culture also serves Dutch political and economic interests” (Ministerie, 2019). New study abroad programs welcoming students from other countries and the International cultural policy of 2021– 2024, which “focuses on a strong position for the Dutch cultural sector abroad through visibility, exchanges and long-term partnerships,” (De Graaff & Feil., n.d.) are both steps in the right direction. However, they largely showcase Dutch culture to other countries as opposed to attempting to culturally understand non-Dutch citizens. How have Dutch immigration policies changed since 2008? Immigration policies in the Netherlands have grown stricter for a few reasons. First, the biggest current influence on immigration policies is the COVID-19 global pandemic and the bans many countries enacted to prevent its transmission. A second challenge affecting immigration policies is the situation in Afghanistan. The US withdrawal from Afghanistan and Taliban taking control led to an increase in Afghan citizens fleeing. As a result, the Netherlands Immigration and Naturalization Service extended the decision period for asylum applications by one year. This change aimed to prevent even more refugees from entering the country. A third reason for tighter restrictions is fear and distrust fueled by a growing populist movement. Far-right populist leaders have taken advantage of the public’s fears to stoke anti-immigration sentiments, aiming to increase support for stricter policies. Yet, despite “global, regional, and national concerns about the impacts of migration and of religious extremism…the reality on the ground at the local level tends to show a different picture. Multiculturalism may be gone, and integration a heated topic. But it is not yet clear that right-wing rhetoric will transform the Netherlands into a closed society” (Van Selm, 2021). References Eertink, L. C. (2020, December 8). The Netherlands: New civic integration act delayed until 1 January 2022. European Website on Integration. Graaff, C. de, & Feil, M. (n.d.). Focal countries. DutchCulture. Ministerie van Algemene Zaken. (2019, August 6). International cultural policy. International cultural cooperation | Government.nl. Selm, J. van (2021, March 28). Migration in the Netherlands: Rhetoric and perceived reality challenge Dutch tolerance. migrationpolicy.org. Retrospective by Sidney Jankanish ’23, Political Science and International Relations December 2022 Benelux, Panama, Hungary Edition Martindale Retrospectives Martindale Center for the Study of Private Enterprise Lehigh University College of Business Rauch Business Center, 621 Taylor Street, Bethlehem, PA 18015-3117 Tel: +1.610.758.4771 | Fax: +1.610.758.6549 | www.lehigh.edu/martindale
Retrospective on Stephanie L. Berger, “The Belgian State: A Unique Past and a Questionable Future” from Benelux: Integration and Individuality Perspectives on Business and Economics, Volume 26, 2008 Stephanie L. Berger ‘08 is now Specification Manager, Hill Residential Systems & Owner, SOLDIERFIT in Trexlertown. Because of divisions in society and polity between the regions of Flanders, Wallonia and the Belgian state, the article noted the potential for a split of the regions. Have Flanders and Wallonia divided from Belgium? Since 2008, the regions of Flanders and Wallonia have not separated from the country of Belgium, despite their ongoing linguistic and cultural conflicts. However, their lack of division does not mean that the two regions are a united front within the state. The country still has a negative view of bilingualism, media sources remain separate by region, and the country cannot seem to keep a consistent government. In addition, the global crisis of COVID-19 has only pushed the two regions even further apart due to their differing governmental approaches. So why has the country managed not to split apart thus far? There are three main reasons. First, most Flemish citizens do not want the country to break apart, despite a minority wanting Flanders to be independent. This is most likely driven by an emotional loyalty to Belgium itself. The second reason is the potential loss of Brussels, Belgium’s capital. Both Wallonia and Flanders rely on Brussels as an economic and political hub and the location of main employment. If the regions were to split, Brussels would become its own region, less accessible to the other two. Third, Flanders and Wallonia would no longer belong to the European Union and, therefore, receive none of the benefits. Both Flanders and Wallonia would each need to apply individually for EU membership and wait years for approval. Overall, there are too many factors of uncertainty. Has the idea of a national Belgian identity and culture strengthened since 2008? How has this impacted the economic/political survival of the state? No, a national Belgian identity and culture has not gained popularity since 2008. Each of the country’s regions have a sense of nationalism for themselves, rather than for the whole. This is reflected in Belgium’s complex political structure. Not only is the country a constitutional monarchy, but it also has “five separate parliaments at three regional levels: the linguistic communities, the Walloon region, and Brussels” (Gupta, 2021). Each of these administrations desires different things and believes they are better than the others. The resulting political environment is not conducive for cooperation. Confronting the coronavirus, “politicians had set aside their differences by opting for a short-term government led by Prime minister Sophie Wilmès” (Moens, 2020). However, the pandemic crisis has led to nothing but healthcare divisions and differing lockdown plans. Another tension is the differing economic vitallity of Flanders and Wallonia. Flanders is thriving economically and wealthier than the impoverished francophone Wallonia. A majority of Flanders residents do not believe they should pay to help those in Wallonia. While the country has survived despite all of these factors, passionate discussion continues about a potential split that will be the end of Belgium. References Gupta, G. (2021, March 18). How can Belgium overcome its regional linguistic conflicts? Social Policy. Moens, B. (2020, May 12). The Flemish nationalist exit strategy. POLITICO. Retrospective by Sidney Jankanish ’23, Political Science and International Relations Martindale Retrospectives 2 December 2022
Retrospective on Allison Warshaw, “Move Over, Florida: Retirement in Panama” From: A New Path for Panama Perspectives on Business and Economics, Volume 25, 2007 Allison Warshaw '07 is now a tax professional. How have US retirees affected the cost of living in Panama? Since 2007, Panama has remained one of the top retirement destinations (behind only Portugal) thanks to its low costs of living, economical healthcare, and beautiful locations. More recently, “Panama no longer is just for retirees. More young couples and professionals from the US, Canada and elsewhere are making the move to the small Central American country of 4.3 million residents” (Wakefield & Chormicle, 2020). Because of this, more land is being purchased by non-locals and real-estate prices are increasing. Not only are US retirees and other expatriates buying up everything, but they are creating American communities that are completely segregated from the rest of the Panamanian population, especially economically. And while the cost of living increases for locals, the retirees more readily can afford the increases. The presence of expatriates is helpful for Panama’s economic growth, yet detrimental to the cost of living for the country’s own citizens. Are US expatriates retiring in Panama beneficial or problematic overall? US expatriates are usually viewed as beneficial to the Panamanian economy because they bring in money and stimulate service jobs for native citizens. International trade in services and tourism contribute significantly to the economy. Indeed, “Panama, over the last decade, has been one of the Western Hemisphere’s fastest growing economies, benefiting from investment-grade credit, a strategic location, and a stable, democratically elected government” (US Department of State). However, the COVID-19 pandemic highlighted how much negative impact the expatriates have on Panama. Since 2007, Panama had high and unstable inflation through 2019, when the pandemic began. Then, in 2020, “the total production of goods and services in the Panamanian economy, measured through GDP, reflected a contraction of 17.9% compared to 2019…. It is considered the fourth-largest drop in the world. Panama depends a lot on international services and those services, as the world was affected, were greatly affected. That caused the economy to fall sharply” (The Tico Times). With Panama going on lockdown with strict curfews and refusing to let in international travelers, thus preventing new expatriates from entering, the economy tumbled. Many domestic service jobs were lost, demonstrating how reliant Panama’s economy has been on the US retirees and the stimulus they bring to the country. Another factor, one often overlooked, is the cultural affect outsiders have. Matthew Kepnes, an expatriate in Panama himself, writes, “I never really thought about the impact that large communities of expats have in developing countries. I don’t think it is for the better…. large amounts of money coming into a country can actually have a negative effect on the people and place” (Kepnes, 2021). References Kepnes, M. (2021, December 31). When the expats come and take over a place. Nomadic Matt's Travel Site. The Tico Times. (2021, March 2). Panama's economy registers historic decline due to pandemic. US Department of State. (2021, July 19). 2020 Investment cimate statements: Panama. Wakefield, S., & Chormicle, X. M. (2020, July 4). American expats find opportunity in Panama, despite the pandemic. Cronkite News—Arizona PBS. Retrospective by Sidney Jankanish ’23, Political Science and International Relations Martindale Retrospectives 3 December 2022
Retrospective on Sabrina (Schneider) Harris, “Panama’s Great Challenge: Reforming the Educational System” From: A New Path for Panama Perspectives on Business and Economics, Volume 25, 2007 Sabrina (Schneider) Harris '07 is now University Relations Manager with the University Studies Abroad Consortium (USAC), a nonprofit organization based at the University of Nevada, Reno. Have reform efforts of Panama’s Ministry of Education improved Panamanian education since 2007? Many educational reform efforts have occurred in Panama, but they continue to be stumped by obstacles. While school attendance is mandatory for students under the age of fifteen, many factors result in dropping out before then. Factors include high rates of teen pregnancy and of child marriages, which are legal for boys at 16 and for girls at 14. Another issue is the inequality of education access for indigenous people. In March 2011, the president of the InterAmerican Development Bank (IDB), the Panamanian Minister of Finance, the Panamanian President, and the Minister of Education, signed a $30 million loan aimed at improving education for indigenous people. “Three ‘central’ schools will be built to each provide services to their network, in this way expanding mid-level (grade 12) education in indigenous areas” (Inter-American Development Bank, 2011). This would allow those who live great distances from the mainland to not have to relocate solely to get their children in school. Unfortunately, despite these efforts, Panama’s education system is still considered one of “the worst in the world,” because “by international standards, quality continues to lag behind. In the World Economic Forum’s (WEF’s) ‘Global Competitiveness Report 2014-15,’ Panama ranked 83rd for the quality of its education system (out of a total of 144 countries)” (Oxford Business Group, 2015). With the appearance of Covid-19, Panama is falling even further behind. With a growing economy but a weak education sector, Panama may soon encounter serious trouble. Has the Inter-American Development Bank’s Educational Development Project helped improve Panamanian education? The IDB’s Educational Development Project has significantly improved Panama’s education situation. While it started in 1995, much ground was not gained until after 2007. To improve success, the IDB started collaborating with other groups, such as the Development Bank of Latin America (CAF) to increase their reach. In May 2019, eight new schools were built by CAF in the Atalaya district, and two of these schools have already been inaugurated and opened. These new schools will each accommodate about 1,300 students and provide furnished classrooms and quality sports facilities. This accomplishment is just one part of the IDB’s vision for educational reform in Panama. They have recently expanded their goals to include achieving social progress for vulnerable populations by 2025. The most recent step is a $15 million grant to improve childhood education in Panama. The project will benefit 25,000 students directly and more than 200,000 students indirectly throughout the country. Overall, in comparison to the Panamanian Ministry of Education, the IDB has been much more successful in reforming Panama’s educational system. References Inter-American Development Bank. (2011, March 2). IDB president promotes Panama's education agenda. IDB. Oxford Business Group. (2015, September 15). Panama makes progress towards sustainable education growth. Oxford Business Group. Retrospective by Sidney Jankanish ’23, Political Science and International Relations Martindale Retrospectives 4 December 2022
Retrospective on Soo Hooi Oh, “Hungarians Abroad” from Transformation In Post-Communist Hungary Perspectives on Business and Economics, Volume 24, 2006 Soo Hooi Oh ’06 is now a Principal Engineer at LTK Engineering Services. What is the current foreign policy in Hungary regarding ethnic Hungarians living abroad? Since 2006, Hungary has stayed the course in viewing “citizenship as not only a legal registry of those residing in the country but more inclusively, considering as citizens those who live outside the borders of the country but are ethnically and culturally Hungarian by heritage” (Kovács, 2017). In 2010, via a referendum signed by Parliament, Hungarian minorities living abroad were granted dual citizenship as well as the right to vote in Hungarian elections. Hungary’s neighbors viewed this accelerated naturalization of 400,000 Hungarians abroad as a security threat to their own countries. So too, the decision was equally disliked domestically for political reasons. However, despite the initial scorn, cultural policies have improved significantly. “An important milestone in promoting ‘Hungarianess’ and helping ethnic Hungarians in Central Europe to preserve their unique cultural and linguistic heritage was the establishing of Duna TV in 1992. The goal of the channel—the first Hungarian language channel to broadcast over satellite—was to be a platform for Hungarian culture and news about Hungary in order to help ethnic Hungarians preserve their identity abroad” (Zemplényi, 2022). Hungary has also financed Hungarian language studies for children in Central Europe and even created a study exchange program. As Hungary’s neighbors joined the EU, did border and minority issues with Hungarians abroad diminish? Hungary’s border and minorities abroad issues did not improve as more of its neighbors joined the EU, but instead worsened. For example, Slovakia and Austria are EU countries that do not allow their Hungarian minorities to have dual citizenship; individuals must choose. Ukraine, now on a fast-track towards EU membership, voted in 2017 to “adopt a new Education Act that restricts the rights of national minorities to receive education in their native language,” (Kovács, 2017) which would prevent Hungarian schoolchildren from receiving schooling in Hungarian. This increased tensions between Hungary and its neighbors, despite the EU ties. Another factor contributing to border dilemmas is the war Russia has waged against Ukraine. Not only have thousands of refugees surged into Hungary daily (ethnic minorities and Ukrainians alike), but also the war fueled the political contest between democracy and autocracy. Viktor Orbán, Hungary’s prime minister of 12 years, won reelection in April this year. Orbán is an ally of Vladimir Putin and shares in his beliefs, with which many domestic Hungarians do not agree. This raises the question: how did Orbán manage to win reelection? Unquestionably, his focus on making Hungarians abroad citizens of the mother country helped. “The Hungarian government sends millions of euros every year to neighbouring countries with Hungarian minorities. According to analysts, Orbán’s intention is to buy votes of Hungarians living abroad” (Hudec, et al., 2021). Thus, even 16 years after Oh’s article was written, politicians still use the Hungarian minority as a political tool for domestic support. References Hudec, M., & Makszimov, V. (2021, October 28). Why Orban Pumps Billions abroad. www.euractiv.com. Kovács, Z. (2017, November 2). Ethnic Hungarians: a nation in a united Europe. About Hungary. Zemplényi, L. (2022, February 3). Hungary and Hungarians – ethnic minorities in Central Europe. Hungarian Conservative. Retrospective by Sidney Jankanish ’23, Political Science and International Relations Martindale Retrospectives 5 December 2022
Retrospective on Amy R. (Rikoon) Confair, “The Hungarian Roma” from Transformation In Post-Communist Hungary Perspectives on Business and Economics, Volume 24, 2006 Amy R. (Rikoon) Confair ’09 is now a Public Health professional. What steps have been taken to improve education, healthcare, housing, and political representation of the Roma in Hungary since 2006? Since 2006, some limited efforts aimed to improve the quality of life for the Roma in Hungary. In 2010, the country created public work programs, such as the “Start Work Programme” fostering employment opportunities for all Hungarian citizens following the recession in 2008. Although these programs combat difficulties finding employment, “Roma face discrimination in some municipalities when applying for and taking part in public work programs” (UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 2016). In 2020, the Council of Europe called for immediate action to “reduce dropout rates in schools and to promote inclusive, high-quality education, and...a comprehensive training programme for teachers in disadvantaged regions” (MTI-Hungary Today, 2020). Despite this call to action, no true change followed. Roma children still face harsh discrimination in schools from teachers and other students, most Roma citizens still live below the poverty line, and all Roma have a significantly lower life expectancy than non-Roma Hungarians. Quality of life for the Hungarian Roma has not improved because “These problems have been sustained by the continued hostility Roma face from police and officials” (Minority Rights Group, 2021). For the most part, have Roma been successful assimilating into the larger community in Hungary? The Roma people have not assimilated into the larger community in Hungary because other Hungarians do not allow them to. Despite the few attempts to implement pro-Roma policies and combat discrimination, racism and hatred by non-Roma Hungarians is too strong. Problems include “a failure to protect Roma community members from attack” (Minority Rights Group, 2021) as highlighted in the 2011 Gyöngyöspata incident where police intentionally failed to help Roma citizens assaulted by vigilantes. Not only are the Roma targeted by the police, parliament members, and average citizens, but they are also the object of abuse in pro-government media. Despite these blatant displays of racism and hatemotivated violence, the state’s response is practically nonexistent. Hungary’s own Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, “himself has described the presence of Roma as ‘Hungary’s historical given…. We are the ones who have to live with this’” (Černušáková, 2017). Additionally, the emergence of COVID-19 pandemic only increased the terrible treatment. Throughout history, the Roma people have been perceived as diseased or unclean, a view only amplified by the pandemic. No matter how many plans are made or programs implemented, until Hungary’s systemic racism is destroyed, the Roma people will never be accepted as part of the country’s community. References Černušáková, B. (2017, January 28). The Roma people's Hungarian Hell. POLITICO. MTI-Hungary Today. (2020, October 12). Council of Europe calls on Hungary to improve roma access to education, housing, Health Care. Hungary Today. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (2016, August 18). Hungary: Situation of roma, including employment, housing, education, healthcare and political participation; whether Roma are required to pay a fee for Health Services (2013-July 2016). Refworld. World Directory of Minority and Indigenous Peoples. (2021, February 5). Roma. Minority Rights Group International. Retrospective by Sidney Jankanish ’23, Political Science and International Relations Martindale Retrospectives 6 December 2022
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