Bellows examined how spiritual groups were adapting to the new sociopolitical systems of Hong Kong and why religion was in danger of being compromised after the handover to Chinese control. What are the impacts of newer legislation like the Hong Kong national security law on the religious group Falun Gong in Hong Kong? Bellows mentioned anxiety by Chinese authorities surrounding reunification as it pertained to religious groups residing in Hong Kong. Much of the concern was whether Hong Kong officials would adhere to the strict laws regarding religion that are in mainland China. Bellows focused on the treatment of Falun Gong, a religious organization that had been outlawed in China in 1999 but was still practicing in Hong Kong. Bellows noted that the Hong Kong chief executive in the early 2000s, Tung Chee-hwa, had referred to the organization as an “evil cult with a terrorist nature.” In June 2020, the Hong Kong national security law (NSL) was passed. Its 66 articles criminalize acts of secession, subversion, terrorism, and collusion with external forces warranting sentences of up to life in prison (Tsoi and Wai, 2022). Following the passage of this law, Falun Gong was still permitted in Hong Kong. Yet Falun Gong members felt increased fear for their safety and wellbeing. Similar fear was expressed by representatives of the Hong Kong Falun Dafa Association (an alternative name for the religious group) and journalists from the Falun Gong newspaper Epoch Times (Banned in China..., 2020). There were, in fact, physical responses to the law: some Falun Gong members noted, “police officers ask[ing] volunteers to take down…banners” that displayed messages like “Heaven will destroy the Communist Party” (Banned in China..., 2020). Since 2020, the group’s general uneasiness has remained. The NSL’s articles on terrorism are clear that much of Falun Gong’s rhetoric may warrant persecution, fueling fears for what is to come for them in Hong Kong. What is the government and public response to Falun Gong and its operations in Hong Kong? Bellows wrote about an anticult law being considered in the early 2000s that would drastically impede religious freedom in Hong Kong and emulate the licensing process that restricts religious institutions in mainland China. At the time, speculative fears centered on potential negative impacts on Hong Kong and its treatment of the Falun Gong. In more recent news, however, it appears that the Falun Dafa Association remains registered as a society in Hong Kong, granting it the ability to “establish offices, collect dues from members, and have legal status” (Office of International Religious Freedom, 2023). Additionally, prior to the passage of the NSL, the organization organized protests, including a march in Hong Kong on the twentieth anniversary of the Beijing demonstrations (Griffiths, 2020). In terms of public responses to the Falun Gong, some pro-Beijing citizens have caused significant problems for the religious group. Serious incidents include a 2019 assault on a Falun Gong practitioner and the destruction in 2020 of Falun Dafa possessions and market stalls (Office of International Religious Freedom, 2023). In both these cases, the perpetrators were prosecuted by the government and received sentences. Ultimately, it appears that while Falun Gong is tolerated, it faces not only opposition from within the government but also passionate animosity—at times violent—among numbers of pro-Beijing citizens, a challenging combination that threatens religious freedom in Hong Kong. References Banned in China, some Falun Gong fear new Hong Kong national security law. (2020, July 26). Reuters. Griffiths, J. (2020, July 18). Can a religious group that wants to bring down China’s Communist Party survive in Hong Kong? CNN. Office of International Religious Freedom. (2023). 2022 Report on International Religious Freedom: China (includes Hong Kong, Macau, Tibet, and Xinjiang): Hong Kong. US Department of State. Tsoi G., & Wai L. C. (2022, June 28). Hong Kong national security law: What is it and is it worrying? BBC. Office for Budget Responsibility. (2022, March). The latest evidence on the impact of Brexit on UK trade Retrospective by Alexander Damle ‘24 Accounting and finance August 2024 Hong Kong, Chile, and Greece Edition Martindale Retrospectives Martindale Center for the Study of Private Enterprise Lehigh University College of Business Rauch Business Center, 621 Taylor Street, Bethlehem, PA 18015-3117 Tel: +1.610.758.4771 | Fax: +1.610.758.6549 | www.lehigh.edu/martindale Retrospective on Aaron Bellows, “The Challenges of Religious Freedom in Post-Transition Hong Kong” from Hong Kong: Asia’s World City Perspectives on Business and Economics, Volume 20, 2002 Aaron Bellows '02 is a gastroenterologist at Princeton Endoscopy Center.
Retrospective on Carolyn Shemwell, “Self-Censorship and the Press in Hong Kong” from Hong Kong: Asia’s World City Perspectives on Business and Economics, Volume 20, 2002 Carolyn (Shemwell) Kaplan '02 is a faculty member in world languages at St. Charles Preparatory School and adjunct faculty member in the Department of Teaching and Learning at The Ohio State University. Shemwell examined what factors contributed to self-censorship in the Hong Kong press and how self -censorship influenced press freedom from 1997 to 2002. How has Chinese legislation impacted censorship in Hong Kong since 2002? Shemwell discussed a 1999 report by the Hong Kong Journalists Association (HKJA), citing their fears that self-censorship was an ongoing issue. In the years since, censorship has worsened, according to the HKJA, mainly due to drastic legislative changes. Hong Kong’s press freedom score was 40.9 in 2018; its 2022 score fell to 25.7 (Hall, 2023). The deterioration has been driven by the passage of the Hong Kong national security law (NSL), passed in June 2020. This legislation criminalizes acts of subversion and penalizes such acts with a maximum sentence of life in prison (Tsoi and Wai, 2022). According to the UK foreign secretary, the legislation led to a “[crack] down on free speech, the free press and free association” (Tsoi & Wai, 2022). One recent application of the NSL as it pertains to journalist censorship was the case of Edmund Wan Yiu-sing, an online radio show host “accused of promoting the idea of Hong Kong independence and resistance against the government” (Walker, 2022). Wan’s 32month prison sentence represents a realization of fears expressed by the HKJA in 1999 and a stark demonstration of the shift in journalism in Hong Kong. What has come of inflammatory and critical publications, specifically Apple Daily? One notable feature of Shemwell’s article was the discussion of China-critical news outlets devoted to expressing their views regardless of potential repercussions from the government. Specifically, Apple Daily, founded in 1995 by entrepreneur and activist Jimmy Lai, adamantly adhered to publishing what they believed despite financial ramifications for Lai’s other business ventures in China. Decades later, following the passage of the NSL in 2020, Apple Daily “was raided twice by police and in August 2020 Lai was arrested” (Lok-kei, 2022). In the crackdown that followed, Apple Daily had funds frozen and was forced to close its publications (Lok-kei. 2022). The closure of Apple Daily, once hailed as a voice of Hong Kong’s pro-democracy movement, underlines a drastic change in the journalism landscape and the extent of censorship in the region. How has censorship in Hong Kong shifted in the global age? The globalization of foreign firms has led to an evolution of censorship, expanding to the online platforms these companies operate in Hong Kong. Due to the NSL, many internet freedoms are being revoked by the government through measures including website blocking, content removal, penalties for online publications, and surveillance (The Impact of the..., 2021). Compounding the decline of press freedoms, many global firms are also actively self-censoring. For example, Apple used its web browser to temporarily block GitLab through a “safe browsing” feature (Trial of Prodemocracy..., 2023). The economic incentives described by Shemwell in her 2002 publication clearly play a large role today in restrictions implemented by major multinational firms. References Hall, C. (2023, July 7). Hong Kong Journalist’s Association: ‘Press freedom index hits new low’. Jurist. The impact of the National Security Law on media and internet freedom in Hong Kong. (2021, September 8). Freedom House. Lok-kei, S. (2022, June 24). A year on from Apple Daily’s closure, what’s left of Hong Kong’s free press? The Guardian. Trial of prodemocracy activists, foreign tech selfcensorship, the Points news outlet launches. (2023, February 27) (Hong Kong Media Bulletin 2023). Freedom House. Tsoi, G., & Wai, L. C. (2022, June 28). Hong Kong national security law: What is it and is it worrying? BBC. Walker, T. (2022, October 14). In Hong Kong, ‘no way journalists can work freely’. VOA. Retrospective by Alexander Damle ‘24 Accounting and finance 2 Martindale Retrospectives August 2024
Martindale Retrospectives Retrospective on Luis A. Arcentales, “Planting the Future: Chile’s Crusade for Agricultural Prosperity” from Chile in Transition Perspectives on Business and Economics, Volume 17, 1999 Luis A. Arcentales '99 is a managing director at The Rohatyn Group. He is also an advisory council member of the Martindale Center. Arcentales analyzed Chile’s economic success in agriculture, identifying internal and external changes that contributed to the development of Chile’s agricultural sector. Has the agricultural sector continued to find success in Chile since 1999? Chile is known for its rich soil and abundant natural resources. The country’s climate allows a wide variety of agriculture to flourish. In 1997, fruit produced most of Chile’s agricultural profits. Today, this still stands true. The most economically important fruits remain grapes (and wine) and apples. Forestry, fisheries, and grains are also major contributors. Chile’s agricultural development benefited from the political and economic climate; free trade agreements and a democratic government have enabled Chile’s agricultural sector to prosper. In 2004, Chile and the United States entered a free trade agreement. This FTA opens markets, eliminates tariffs on imported goods, reduces trade barriers, and requires enforcement of labor and environmental standards. In 2015, the agreement was fully implemented, and all exports from Chile entered the US freely and vice versa. This trade agreement advanced the development of Chile’s agricultural exports and strengthened relations with the US. In 2023, agricultural and related sectors made up “24.4 percent of total Chilean exports, 9 percent of total GDP, and around 10 percent of Chile’s labor force” (International Trade Administration, 2023). Overall, Chile’s economy has expanded in the 2020s, “driven by increasing domestic consumption, public investment and external demand” (Food Export…, 2023). However, Chile’s long-term economic growth and the health of the agricultural sector are difficult to forecast due to climate change, lingering effects of COVID, and inflationary pressures. Have there been developments in Chile’s agricultural sustainability since 1999? Sustainable development in agriculture has been a topic of discussion in Chile. Challenges to the availability of scarce natural resources have hindered agricultural development in Chile. In particular, “Chilean agriculture uses 72 percent of the country’s water resources” (International Trade Administration, 2023), with climate change causing droughts across Chile, where the rainfall deficit, depending on location, ranges from 20% percent to 90% (International Trade Administration, 2023). Chile’s existing FTA dismisses sustainability concerns such as water scarcity, emissions, and biodiversity preservation. Chile’s support for farmers is also among the lowest of all countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, contributing to agricultural labor shortages. Many farmers have opted for less labor-intensive jobs with higher pay in other sectors. Nevertheless, recent policy initiatives, like the Sustainability Strategy for the Chilean Agri-food Sector in August 2021, with the goal of identifying “the best agricultural practices for sustainable production of agricultural products” (OECD, 2022), have been introduced aiming to enhance sustainability. References Food Export Association of the Midwest USA and Food Export USA–Northeast. (2023). Chile country profile. International Trade Administration. (2023, December 7). Chile country commercial guide. US Department of Commerce. OECD. (2022). Agricultural policy monitoring and evaluation 2022: Reforming agricultural policies for climate change mitigation. OECD Publishing. doi.org/10.1787/7f4542bf-en Retrospective by Randi Conroy ‘25 Finance, with mass communication minor 3 August 2024
Retrospective on Jeffrey A. Laborsky, “The Development of Financial Markets in Chile” from Chile in Transition Perspectives on Business and Economics, Volume 17, 1999 Jeffrey Laborsky '99 serves as chief executive officer of Heritage Environmental Services and board member of Heritage Group Holdings. Laborsky investigated reasons for the growth in investments and financial markets in Chile. He reviewed market performance and analyzed Chile’s economic situation. How have Chilean financial markets developed since 1999? Chile has sustained relatively steady economic growth since the 1990s. An open market and sustainable macroeconomic policies have supported this growth. Chile has a large and stable nonbank financial sector consisting of pension funds, mutual funds, and insurers. The financial markets took hits from social uprisings in Chile in 2019, followed closely by the COVID pandemic in 2020. However, a review by the International Monetary Fund (2021) concludes that the “twin shocks…were adeptly managed thanks to massive and well-coordinated supervisory and fiscal policy responses.” Since then, nonbank financial market actors have rebalanced portfolios in efforts to reduce risk. These events also tightened the liquidity of the banking sector. Chile experienced high inflation and accompanying elevated interest rates through 2022 and 2023. However, rates have since declined. The inflation rate in October 2022 was 12.8% but had fallen to 4.8% by November 2023 (Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas, 2023). What is the status of capital controls on investments in Chile? At the time of Laborsky’s article in 1999, many capital controls hindered investments into Chile. Since then, Chile has relaxed its capital controls. Tax reforms eliminated requirements of Decree Law 600 for a minimum stay for all foreign investments. As of January 1, 2016, foreign investors can choose between foreign investment statutes in Law 600 or Law 20.848. The latter law liberalizes foreign investments, “establishes the frame for ‘direct foreign investment’ in Chile and creates a Committee of Ministers for the promotion of foreign investment, as well as an Agency for the promotion of foreign investment” (Chili: Corporate..., 2023). Investors can freely invest in Chile as long as they go through the formal ex- change market. How have foreign investments in Chile developed since 1999? Chile has taken steps to create an inviting environment for foreign investors. The country has reduced entry barriers, adapted nondiscrimination policies for foreign investors, and encouraged foreign direct investment (FDI). These changes successfully fueled FDI growth, mainly in mining, financial services, agriculture, commerce, energy, and manufacturing. In 2018, Chile launched an updated online system that enabled smoother business transactions. Tax information, submission of complaints relating to contract enforcement, and registration of private companies were revised to make investments by foreigners easier. In 2022, FDI in Chile “rose by 32% to USD 13 billion, sustained by several large acquisitions and renewed interest in the mining industry, with the number of international project finance deals increasing 80% to 88 projects” (Santander, 2023). Chile’s macroeconomic stability has also helped attract FDI, making the country one of the most prosperous in South America. Fiscally, “foreign investors benefit from a moderate corporate tax and they are guaranteed access to the formal foreign exchange market, including free remittance of capital and profits” (Santander, 2023). The US has remained Chile’s top investor. Promoting FDI has been a strong economic driver for Chile and a main government developmental strategy. References Chili: Corporate - tax credits and incentives. (2023, September 6). PwC. Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas. Chile. (2023, November). Price indices and inflation. National Statistics Institute. International Monetary Fund. (2021, December). Chile: Financial system stability assessment. Santander | Trade. (2023, October). Chile: Foreign investment. Banco Santander. Retrospective by Randi Conroy ‘25 Finance, with mass communication minor Martindale Retrospectives 4 August 2024
Martindale Retrospectives 5 August 2024 Retrospective on Anjan Gupta, “Greek Pension Reforms: The Struggle to Build a Sustainable Bridge to Retirement” from Greece: The Epic Battle for Economic Recovery Perspectives on Business and Economics, Volume 30, 2012 Ankit (Anjan) Gupta '12 is co-founder of Beacon Community, in Gurgaon India, a VP at Global Impact Partners, and serves on the board of Prismflare, a blockchain payments firm he co-founded. Gupta analyzed the historical roots of the Greek pension system and how and why the system evolved as it did. Has Greece had more pension reforms since the article was published? Greece passed pension reform laws in 2016, 2017, and 2022. The reform in 2016 included uniting all insurance funds under one agency, splitting the main pension into a national pension and contributory pension, and instituting equal pension rights and a measure for the containment of pension expenditure (Ziomas & Theodoroulakis, 2016). The pension system was composed of three pillars: government-financed universal old-age benefits, an earnings-related benefit with a 20% contribution rate, and a notional defined contribution (NDC) with a 6% contribution rate (Altiparmakov, 2022). While this reform had its shortcomings, it was overall well received because the reform served its purpose of improving pensions by eliminating inequalities related to crucial aspects of pensions, such as funding, coverage, and level of benefits (Ziomas & Theodoroulakis, 2016). A 2017 reform was adopted to stimulate growth and employment and spur intergenerational equity. It would have also reduced pensions for 1.4 million existing retirees and produced a budget savings of 1%of GDP. But, due to a lack of political will, it was abandoned in 2019, a few days before it was to become effective. Despite this, by 2019 the pension system was mostly consolidated and on its way to fiscal viability. Then in 2019 there was a change in the ruling party of Greece and another review of the pension system occurred. The 2022 pension reform changed a critical policy of the 2016 pension system: instead of an NDC, there was now a defined contribution, and a portion of current contributions was carved out to fund individual pension savings accounts, reducing funds available for paying existing pensions. The aim of this new pension system was to assign a dedicated government body to the management of individual pension savings to try to remedy inherent market failures in private pension provisions (Altiparmakov, 2022). Has Greece established a sustainable pension system since 2012? Unfortunately, the pension reform of 2022 undid the good of the 2016 reform. Court rulings and politics continue to play a large part in the pension system. The 2022 reform is a major shift. Diverting funds to individual pensions without accompanying austerity measures gives rise to a suboptimal pay-as-you-go approach, requiring that existing pension obligations during the transition be paid out of tax revenues rather than pension contributions. Greek policymakers underestimated the multidecade journey needed for the pension system to reach stability (Altiparmakov, 2022). Compared to other countries that have adopted the carve-out funding approach, Greece’s typical age for voluntarily opting into the funded pension system is 35, whereas it is about 50 in the other countries. This fact alone will cause transition costs to be more backlogged, which could be a positive if it allows time for the new system to gain public support. In the short term though, without a funding injection this new system is not sustainable during the transition, which would undoubtedly create fiscal distress for people entering retirement. However, the distress can be avoided if there is a political commitment to finance the transition costs (Altiparmakov, 2022). In addition to fiscal distress, the reform might create economic tension if the new system does not outperform the previous NDC mechanism, which could foment uproar for reversing the reform regardless of the actual fiscal situation (Altiparmakov, 2022). References Altiparmakov, N. (2022, March). The 2022 Greek pension reform: Rebirth of carve-out privatization in Eastern Europe (Working paper: 208/22). Center for Research on Pensions and Welfare Policies. Ziomas, D., & Theodoroulakis, M. (2016, July). The new Greek pension reform: improving governance and ensuring sustainability (European Social Policy Network Flash Report 2016/63). European Commission. Retrospective by Isabel Carino-Bazan ‘25 Molecular biology and economics
Retrospective on Brian Berzin, “The Greek Debt Crisis and Its Impact on Eurozone Sovereign Debt” from Greece: The Epic Battle for Economic Recovery Perspectives on Business and Economics, Volume 30, 2012 Brian Berzin '13 is the CEO of Thea Energy in New York. Berzin examined the underlying causes of the Greek and European debt crisis and the failure of the eurozone to maintain economic stability. Has Greece changed significantly enough to move past its historical debt? While Greece has had policy changes and additional austerity packages since 2012, the debt-to-GDP ratio is still high, at 200% (Singh, 2022). Through bailout programs approved in 2012 and 2015 from the EU and IMF, Greece was forced to reanalyze its finances (Council on Foreign Relations, 2023). Although Greece did not want to implement austerity packages, the EU required Greece to adopt these measures in return for the bailout loans (Singh, 2022). The austerity packages, a combination of spending cuts and tax increases, had some benefits in forcing Greece to modernize its fiscal policy management. However, the austerity packages had detrimental effects on the population. The packages created more unemployment, increased poverty and inequality, and were weaponized by Greece’s political parties (Council on Foreign Relations, 2023). Instead of austerity improving Greece’s debt burden, it reduced wages and GDP growth, developments that can actually increase the debt-to-GDP ratio (Singh, 2022). Greece’s government implemented policy changes alongside the austerity packages to decrease the debt-to-GDP ratio. But then, the COVID-19 crisis hit, necessitating more borrowing and further debt (Singh, 2022). Although the measures taken by Greece thus far have been unsuccessful, the former Greek minister of economy and finance believes that debt-to-GDP can be reduced through a policy of “gradual adjustment” where the debt burden shrinks GDP over time with increases in taxation, reduction of government spending, debt restructuring, and partial debt write-offs (Alogoskoufis, 2021). Has the eurozone established more regulations to avoid financial crises? The eurozone has taken measures to integrate regulation policies among the EU member states. More than 50 legislative and nonlegislative proposals offered a degree of centralization by transferring financial supervision and responsibility to the EU, instead of it being at a national level (Scheinert, 2023). One example is the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, signed by 25 of the 27 EU member states. The Fiscal Compact section of the treaty requires governments to maintain balanced budget deficits below 0.5% of GDP. One of the flaws of this treaty is that while it attempts to provide measures for helping countries that exceed the 0.5% target, there are no enforcement conditions in the treaty (Council on Foreign Relations, 2023). Another policy is the Single Supervisory Mechanism regulation. This policy increases supervision of all banks in EU countries and ensures measures are taken by banks to prevent future failures (Scheinert, 2023). International forums also began playing a larger role in creating rules and standards for a central regulatory system (Scheinert, 2023). Despite all the proposals, there are still no common fiscal policies between the eurozone governments. Fiscal policies would require a political consensus between the eurozone countries, which is challenging because of the substantial diversity of their individual policies and economic and fiscal stability, especially after previous financial crises (Singh, 2022). References Alogoskoufis, G. (2021, February 23). The pandemic and Greece’s debt: The day after. Centre for Economic Policy Research. Council on Foreign Relations. (2023). 1974 – 2018 Greece’s debt crisis. Scheinert, C. (2023, October). Financial services policy (Fact sheets on the European Union). European Parliament. Singh, A. (2022, October 10). A tale of two countries: A history of the Greek debt crisis. Berkeley Economic Review. Retrospective by Isabel Carino-Bazan ’25 Molecular biology and economics Martindale Retrospectives 6 August 2024
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